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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the Order of the Utah
Supreme Court dated September 4, 1998, and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Appellee The Travelers Indemnity Company ("Travelers") submits the following
statement of the issues on appeal and standards of appellate review, as it disagrees with the
issues framed by the appellant Carla Cannon ("Cannon"). Travelers submits that the issues
are as follows:
1. Whether Cannon, who is neither a named insured nor an insured under the
Travelers policy issued to Scott and Jesselie Anderson, is owed the duty of good faith and
fair dealing when she had no contractual privity or contractual relationship with Travelers?
2. Whether Cannon, who is neither a named insured nor an insured, under a
homeowner's policy to which she is not a party, should be entitled to the same duty of good
faith and fair dealing as those who are parties by the contract?
3. Whether Travelers should be held liable for alleged breach of a duty of good faith
and fair dealing to a stranger to the insurance policy if such a cause of action is now extended
to persons having no contractual privity and no contractual relationship even though such a
claim has not previously been recognized in Utah and existing Utah law has required
contractual privity?
4.

Whether Cannon, a claimant without contractual privity or a contractual

relationship with Travelers, should be entitled to assert a claim for breach of a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing where her claim for medical payments was fairly debatable?
5. Whether Utah's unfair claim settlement practices statutes and rules which are
-1-

regulatory in nature should create a private cause of action despite express provisions stating
that no private cause of action is created?
6. Whether broad consequential damages should be available for breach of express
terms of an insurance policy, as opposed to the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, contrary to the law set forth in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461
(Utah 1996)?
The applicable standard of appellate review on all of these issues is correction of
error.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no determinative statutes or regulations in this appeal. The issues in this
appeal are governed by Utah case law and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case.
This action involves Cannon's claim for alleged breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in an insurance policy, i.e., an insurance "bad faith" claim. The
insurance at issue is a homeowner's policy issued by Travelers to Scott and Jesselie
Anderson. Cannon was not a party to the insurance contract. Cannon's claim arises out of
an incident while she was visiting the Anderson home and the Andersons' ten year old
daughter (Cannon's niece) ran to greet her. Cannon claims that she injured her back when
her niece jumped up and threw her arms around her in greeting her. Although allegedly
feeling immediate pain and continuing to suffer from the back pain for months, Cannon did
not complain to the Andersons at the time of the incident, did not say that she was in any
pain, and withheld any information concerning the alleged injury or her pain until almost
-2-

four months later even though she continued to see and socialize with the Andersons. When
Cannon told the Andersons, nearly four months following the alleged incident, that she had
been injured on their premises when their daughter greeted her, the Andersons questioned
whether Cannon's injury was actually related to the greeting incident.
Travelers first notification of the alleged claim was on January 5,1993, four and a half
months after the incident. Investigation of the incident revealed that Cannon had not
mentioned anything to the Andersons until three and a half months had elapsed. The
Andersons were completely unaware of any problem and Jesselie Anderson did not notice
anything amiss at the time of the incident, even though she was present when her daughter
greeted Cannon. Travelers' claims adjuster advised Cannon that he questioned how her
injury could be related to the incident at the Anderson home. Cannon subsequently provided
a letter from her physician indicating that in his opinion the injury that Cannon sustained in
August 1992 could have subsequently led to her herniated disc and the surgery performed.
There was no further evidence provided that Cannon's herniated disc and surgery in
December 1992 were causally connected to the greeting incident.
After attempting to work through uncertainties about the claim, Travelers and Cannon
were unable to come to a resolution. Cannon subsequently instituted this lawsuit against
Travelers making a claim for medical expenses under the medical payment coverage
provision of the Andersons' policy and further making a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After initial discovery, Cannon submitted a
settlement demand to Travelers. Cannon submitted affidavits from her parents and sister
with the settlement demand, which, for the first time, provided Travelers with evidence that
Cannon had complained of back pain immediately following the incident. The affidavits
-3-

explained that Cannon complained about her back pain to her parents the evening of the
incident and further explained that Cannon and her parents discussed that it would be better
not to mention anything to the Andersons because the Andersons were important witnesses
in litigation involving the estate of Cannon's deceased sister. Cannon therefore withheld any
information concerning her alleged injury from the Andersons until she underwent surgery
some three and one-half months following the incident. After receiving the affidavits in
conjunction with the settlement demand, Travelers paid the full $10,000 limits of its medical
payments coverage to Cannon.
Course Of Proceedings And Disposition At Trial Court.
Travelers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Cannon's remaining claims on
July 14,1997. Travelers' motion was based upon the grounds that there was no further claim
for breach of the express contract terms afterpayment of the medical expenses, that there was
no claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing since Cannon had
no contractual privity with Travelers, and that the validity of Cannon's claim was fairly
debatable. (R. 115-199) A hearing on the motion was held on November 10,1997. The court
ruled that the first and third causes of action of plaintiff s first amended complaint would be
dismissed on the ground that Cannon lacked contractual privity with Travelers and was not
defined as an insured in the policy, and that a right to sue for medical benefits, without
contractual privity, did not give rise to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that exists
between parties to the contract. The court further dismissed the fourth cause of action ruling
that alleged violations of the Utah Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Statutes and Rules do
not give rise to any private cause of action. On Cannon's second cause of action, for breach
of the express policy terms, the court ruled that the broad consequential damages sought were
-4-

not available for breach of the express terms, but denied the motion to the extent that Cannon
sought attorney's fees and litigation expenses incurred in pursuing her claim for
reimbursement of medical expenses, and further sought interest on the medical expenses up
to the point when they were paid.
The court's order granting partial summary judgment and denying the motion in part,
was entered on December 10, 1997. (R.l 146 and Addendum 1.) The parties subsequently
settled the remaining part of the second cause of action, which settlement included the
payment of Cannon's claim for costs, attorney's fees and interest in connection with the
claim to recover the medical benefits. The parties therefore stipulated to an Order of
Dismissal with prejudice on this remaining claim, and an Order of Dismissal was entered by
the court on April 30, 1998. (R.l 151-1154 and Addendum 2 and 3).
Statement Of Facts.
Travelers initially notes that Cannon's statement of facts misstates the record in many
particulars and further sets forth much by way of argument. Travelers submits that the
argumentative, conclusory fashion of Cannon's statement of facts is improper and should be
left for the argument. Importantly, Cannon's statement of facts, whether misstated or based
on argument, are immaterial to the issues presented here, which are issues of law.
Travelers further notes that Cannon's statement of facts references the affidavits of
Gary Fye, submitted by Cannon as an insurance claims expert. Travelers submits that the
references to Gary Fye's affidavit consist of unsupported opinions, legal conclusions and
argument. Travelers made a motion with the trial court to strike the affidavit of Gary Fye as
it did not comply with Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as the affidavit was
replete with conclusory, argumentative statements and there were few, if any, admissible
-5-

facts set forth in the affidavit. While the trial court did not rule upon the motion to strike, it
is obvious that the court did not accept the statements in the affidavit. Travelers submits that
the affidavit should not be considered on appeal for the same reasons that it should not have
been considered below and hereby incorporates its motion to strike affidavit testimony and
supporting memoranda. (R.1030-1040, 1125-1133.) In addition to all of the grounds for
inadmissibility, the statements and arguments are immaterial as this appeal presents issues
of law for determination by the court.
Travelers submits the following statement of facts as facts that are material to the
issues on appeal:
1. On August 16, 1992, Cannon was visiting at the home of Scott and Jesselie
Anderson. Scott Anderson is Cannon's first cousin and Cannon has also known Jesselie
Anderson since 1963. (R. 1167 at pp.11,12.)
2. While at the Anderson home, Cannon bent over to hug the Andersons' ten year old
daughter Heidi, who had run up to greet her. (R. 1167 at p.24.)
3. Cannon alleges that she felt immediate pain when she bent over and Heidi threw
her arms around her, but she did not tell anyone that she was hurt or suffered pain. (R. 1167
at pp. 32, 33.)
4. Between the date of the incident, August 16, 1992, and Thanksgiving 1992,
Cannon did not seek any medical attention for her alleged back injury. (R. 1167 at p. 51.)
5. Cannon did not say anything to the Andersons about the incident or her alleged
injury until December 3, 1992, despite having talked to Jesselie Anderson on several
occasions. (R. 1167 at pp. 47, 48.)
6. At the time of the incident, the Andersons had a policy of homeowner's insurance
-6-

with Travelers. This policy provided liability coverage for the Andersons, which included
a medical payments provision.

The pertinent part of Travelers policy is contained in

Coverage F-Medical Payments to Others. This coverage is part of the Liability Coverages
provided to the Andersons under Section II of the policy. (See policy at R.151-185, and
Liability Coverages including medical payments to others provision at R. 166, and Appellee's
Addendum 4, p.26.)
7. Travelers received its first notice of Cannon's claim involving the August 1992
incident on January 5, 1993. The claim letter submitted by Cannon to Travelers is dated
December 21, 1992, but the claim was not received by Travelers until January 5, 1993.
(R.l 166 at pp. 4, 7, 58.)
8. Tom Day, the claims adjuster for Travelers discussed the claim with Cannon and
with the Andersons. The Andersons told Mr. Day that they did not know anything about
Cannon's claim until December 1992, and that they thought Cannon may have injured her
back in a sporting event or by trying to lift her invalid father. (R.l 167 at p.85; R.l 166 at
pp.88-90, 127.)
9. Unbeknownst to either Travelers or the Andersons, Cannon intentionally withheld
information concerning her injury from the Andersons for several months because Cannon's
family needed the Andersons as supportive witnesses in litigation involving the estate of
Cannon's deceased sister. (R.l 167 at pp. 41-47.)
10. When Travelers' claims adjuster asked Cannon for proof that her herniated disc
and back surgery were causally related to the incident at the Anderson home, Cannon
provided a letter from her treating physician, stating that the injury sustained by Cannon in
August 1992 could have subsequently led to the disc rupture and surgical intervention.
-7-

(R.189.) There was no other medical evidence drawing a causal connection between the
incident and Cannon's medical condition.
11. After initiating this lawsuit in October 1994, Cannon's counsel submitted a
settlement proposal to Travelers by letter of June 9,1995. This settlement proposal included
affidavits from Cannon's parents, Elaine Cannon and D. James Cannon, and from Cannon's
sister, Susan C. McOmber. These affidavits, for the first time, explained to Travelers why
Cannon had not complained to the Andersons for several months, and further provided
evidence that Cannon had told her parents about the incident and had complained of back
pain the evening of the incident. (See affidavits of Elaine Cannon, D. James Cannon, and
Susan C. McOmber, R.190, 194, 197, respectively.)
12. The affidavit of Elaine Cannon, provided to Travelers in June of 1995, stated that
her daughter told her about the incident the afternoon of August 16, 1992 and that Cannon
described having felt immediate back pain. The affidavit further stated that:
However, we discussed that it would be better not to mention anything to the
Andersons. Scott and Jesselie Anderson were important witnesses with our
family in litigation involving the estate of our deceased daughter. It was
important that nothing be done to offend or alienate the Andersons. I therefore
strongly suggested to Carla that she not address this matter with the
Andersons. Hopefully, her back injury would improve without the need of any
medical treatment and we would never need to involve the Andersons.
(R.191.) The affidavit goes on to explain that Cannon continued to have back problems
during the ensuing months until she sought medical attention and had surgery.
13. The affidavit of Susan C. McOmber indicated that on August 21 or 22, 1992,
Cannon had confided in her that she had injured her back while visiting the Anderson home,
but that she did not report the incident to the Andersons because they were witnesses in a
lawsuit brought against the Cannon family by Cannon's deceased sister's husband. (R. 197-8-

8.)
14. After receiving and considering the affidavits submitted by Cannon in June 1995,
Travelers paid the limits of its medical payments coverage to Cannon. Payment was
tendered by letter dated July 18, 1995 (R.123.)
15. Cannon is not a named insured under the Travelers insurance policy and further
does not qualify as an "insured" as defined in the policy. The term "insured" is defined to
mean the named insured [Scott and Jesselie Anderson] and residents of the named insured's
household, as well as other specified persons with respect to responsibility for animals,
watercraft, or the use of vehicles. (See policy R. 153,154; R. 1166 at Ex. 2, Addendum 4, pp.
1,2.)
Response To Cannon's Asserted Statement Of Facts
As noted above, many of Cannon's asserted facts misstate the record, contain
argument, and refer to inadmissible evidence. Moreover, many of the assertions are
immaterial to the legal issues in this appeal. Travelers nevertheless responds to Cannon's
statement of facts, by paragraph, as follows:
1. Paragraph 1 misstates the record. The record reflects that Heidi was ten years old
at the time. (R.l 166, Ex.1, p.7.)
5. Paragraph 5 misstates the record. Jesselie Anderson advised Cannon that she had
called her father, who is an insurance agent, and Anderson's father said that Travelers would
deny the claim. For that reason, Anderson told Cannon that she was not going to submit a
claim to Travelers. (R.l 167 at pp.63-64.)
7. Paragraph 7 misstates the record. The claim letter submitted by Cannon to
Travelers is dated December 21, 1992, but the claim was not received by Travelers until
-9-

January 5, 1993. (R.1166 at Ex.1, pp.4, 7.)
9. Paragraph 9 consists of argument, not fact. Contrary to Cannon's argument, Mr.
Day did not refuse to accept further information concerning the incident or to interview
witnesses. Mr. Day interviewed Jesselie Anderson and she advised him that she knew
nothing of Cannon's claimed injury until December 1992, and that she thought Cannon may
have injured her back in a sporting event or by trying to lift her invalid father. (R. 1167 at
p.85; R.1166 at pp. 88-90.)
10. Contrary to Cannon's statement of fact in paragraph 10, Travelers did not refuse
to obtain medical records. Mr. Day obtained records from Dr. Hecht. (R. 1166 at pp.98,99.)
Travelers further obtained a statement from Dr. J. Lynn Smith. Dr. Smith did not causally
relate Cannon's back surgery to the August 16,1992 incident, but stated only that the injury
could have subsequently led to the disc rupture and surgery. (R.189.)
11. Contrary to Cannon's statement in paragraph 11, Cannon did not urge Mr. Day
to call her parents to confirm the injury. Cannon testified that Mr. Day asked her who knew
about the injury, and she told him several people and probably mentioned the names of her
parents. (R.l 167 at pp.81-83.) Day used the phrase "medical certainty" rather than "more
likely than not." However, Dr. Smith's indication that the injury "could have" been related
to the August 1992 incident does not meet either standard.
12. Paragraph 12 misstates the record. Cannon did not continue to urge Day to
contact health care providers. Mr. Day obtained records from Dr. Hecht and a letter from Dr.
J. Lynn Smith. (R.l 166 at pp.95-97.) Day did not receive sufficient medical evidence that
Cannon's claim was causally related to the incident on the Andersons' premises. Whether
Day used the phrase "medical certainty", "probability" or "more likely than not" is
-10-

immaterial since the medical evidence indicated only a possibility. (R. 1166 at pp. 130,131.)
13. Paragraph 13 is based upon Fye's affidavit testimony. This testimony is
inadmissible and should not be considered. (See Travelers Motion to Strike Affidavit
Testimony, R.1030-1040; 1125-1133.)
14. Travelers' settlement offer to Cannon was made simply in an effort to resolve and
conclude the claim, despite the fact that there was insufficient medical proof to show that
Cannon's injury occurred on Travelers' insureds' premises. (R.l 166 at pp. 94, 95.)
15. Travelers' payment of $352.20 was an effort to pay out-of-pocket medical
expenses at the time. Mr. Day was simply unable to duplicate the calculation at the time of
his deposition. (R. 1166 at pp. 103-108.)
16. Travelers made a settlement proposal to Cannon in an effort to resolve and close
the file on June 14, 1993. This settlement offer was rejected by Cannon. (R.l 166 at pp.94,
95.)
17. Paragraph 17 is argumentative. Travelers did not refuse to communicate further,
but had not received sufficient evidence to substantiate Cannon's claim and no further
evidence was provided until after the filing of the complaint when affidavits of Cannon's
parents were produced in June, 1995. (R.l90-199.)
18. After receiving the letter from Cannon's attorney, Travelers re-opened the claim
file. It was not noted by Mr. Day's supervisor that the prior investigation had been
incomplete. Rather, there is simply a notation in the file, following the receipt of the
attorney's letter, that more investigation is needed. (R.l 166 at Exh. 1, pp. 4, 6.)
20. Paragraph 20 and each of its subparagraphs contain argument, rather than facts.
As was set forth in Travelers motion to strike affidavit testimony, these arguments and
-ll-

conclusory statements by Fye should have been stricken and should not be considered here
on appeal. The arguments are immaterial to the legal issues involved in this appeal. Fye's
testimony assumes the existence of a legal duty, which is a legal issue for the court.
21. Paragraph 21 also consists of argument. It is not a factual statement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, a bad faith claim is derived from the insurance contract in both firstparty and third-party situations. The implied covenant runs only to the benefit of those who
were parties to the contract. Cannon was not a party to the insurance contract and does not
qualify as an insured under the policy. Instead, Cannon is a claimant making a claim for
medical expenses under the medical payment provision of the policy, which is part of the
liability coverages provided to the insureds under the policy. There is nothing under the
medical payments provision granting a right to a claimant to sue Travelers. Cannon's
assertion that she is a "first-party insured" is contrary to the policy language and is simply
an attempt to create a contractual relationship with Travelers where none exists.
Cannon argues that the several Utah cases that have outlined the duty of good faith
and fair dealing have not sufficiently outlined the law to govern this matter. Cannon
essentially urges the court to look to the law of other states and ignore well-defined Utah law.
Utah courts have held strictly to the rule that in order to maintain an insurance bad faith
claim, the parties must be in privity of contract. Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that such a claim may be brought only by a party to the insurance contract. In Savage
v. Educators Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995), the court rejected a bad faith claim despite
the appearance of a contractual relationship and a right to sue on the part of the claimant.
Like Savage, Travelers would have an unresolvable conflict if it were deemed to owe
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Cannon a contractual duty of good faith and its insured a contractual duty of good faith. The
two parties have diametrically opposed interests.
Cannon is not a third-party beneficiary to the medical payments provision, but is
rather an incidental beneficiary. The primary purpose of the provision is to benefit the
Andersons, as the insureds. There is no expression of an intent to provide injured claimants
with a right to sue Travelers for the medical benefits. However, even if Cannon is deemed
an intended third-party beneficiary, the intended benefit is only to the extent of the medical
payments. There is no expression of an intent by the contracting parties to confer the greater
benefit of the implied covenants that flow only between the parties to the contract.
The unfair claims settlement practices statute and rule do not create any private cause
of action. Utah case law establishes when the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
arises. Cannon's reliance upon industry standards and expert testimony is misplaced.
The claim submitted by Cannon was fairly debatable. Cannon claimed that she
seriously injured her back while greeting Andersons' ten year old daughter. No one present
noticed anything amiss, nothing was said, and Cannon intentionally withheld any information
about her claim until she needed surgery for her back condition. The causal connection
between the greeting incident and Cannon's serious back injury was certainly questionable.
Under these circumstances, there were factual issues as to the claim's validity, legitimizing
denial of the claim. Under Utah law, where there is a debatable reason for denial, the claim
is fairly debatable as a matter of law, eliminating the bad faith claim.
The established Utah law has recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in only two situations, both of which involve the insurer's own insured. The duty has
not been extended to third-party beneficiaries. If the duty is now extended to persons in
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Cannon's position, Travelers should not be held to have breached a newly recognized duty.
Travelers has paid the limits of the medical payments coverage, incurred costs,
attorney's fees, and interest, and should therefore have no further damage exposure for
alleged breach of the express terms of the contract.
If a cause of action for insurance bad faith is extended to any medical payment
claimant who is not a party to the insurance contract, the class of potential bad faith plaintiffs
becomes limitless. This type of coverage is not mandatory and is simply an additional benefit
provided to insured homeowners. If insurers become exposed to an endless array of bad faith
claims arising out of the medical payments coverage, insurers would be better off not to offer
the coverage. These claims are not in the interest of the public, and there is no reason to
extend the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to med-pay claimants. The benefits
available to such claimants should be limited to the medical expenses themselves. The
availability of a bad faith claim should be limited to the parties to the contract.
ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court entered summary judgment dismissing Cannon's claim for alleged
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after reviewing lengthy
memoranda filed by both parties. This court reviews the district court's order under the same
standard employed by the district court under Utah R.Civ.P. 56. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740
P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). Summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Although this court reviews the district court decision for correction of error without
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, under standards of appellate
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review, this court should affirm the district court if its decision is sustainable on any proper
ground. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm the trial court if we can do so
on any proper ground even if the court below assigned an incorrect reason for
its ruling.
Allphin Realty. Inc. v. Sine. 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979). See also Buehner Block Co.
v.UWC Assoc. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). This rule of appellate review applies even if the
proper ground was not raised in or considered by the lower court, and even if the proper
ground is not urged on appeal. Goodsel v. Dept. of Business Reg.. 523 P.2d 1230, 1232
(Utah 1974).
II. RULES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION.
The policy language at issue is clear and unambiguous and should therefore be
interpreted as a matter of law. Insurance policies are merely contracts and should be
interpreted under the same rules governing ordinary contracts. Village Inn Apts. v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990). Whether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law and if a contract is determined to be unambiguous its
interpretation is also a question of law. Id. A policy term is not ambiguous merely because
one party assigns a different meaning to it in accordance with his or her own interest. Id. at
583. The terms of insurance contracts should be interpreted in accordance with their usually
accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, with an attempt to harmonize and give
effect to all of the contract provisions. Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992).
The general rule of interpretation favors the insured when the policy contains
ambiguous provisions. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993).
One acknowledged rationale for this rule is the need to afford the protection that the insured
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endeavored to secure by paying premiums. LPS Hospital v Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d
857, 858 (Utah 1988). This general rule of interpretation, however, operates only after the
insured has been determined. "It does not operate in deciding whether a certain entity
belongs to the insured class described in the policy. Accordingly, a third person who is not
a party to a contract of insurance usually is not entitled to a construction in his favor in
determining whether that third person is an insured." Atlas Assurance Co. v. General
Builders. 600 P.2d 850, 853 (N.M. App. 1979). See also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Aztec Plumbing Corp.. 796 P.2d 227, 229 (Nev. 1990) ("the rule that ambiguities in an
insurance contract are liberally construed in favor of the insured does not apply in deciding
who is an insured.")
III. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING UNDER UTAH LAW IS
DEPENDENT UPON CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY OR A DIRECT CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIP.
Cannon was not a party to the insurance contract and lacks the requisite contractual
privity or direct contractual relationship necessary to make a claim under Utah law for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Cannon attempts to characterize
herself as an "unnamed insured" and a first-party insured in order to create a contractual
relationship. Cannon is neither a named insured nor an unnamed insured under the policy.
Cannon's attempt to categorize her status as a first-party insured as opposed to a third-party
claimant does not make her a party to the contract.
A. Background of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Utah.
The law in Utah with regard to direct claims against insurers is well-settled. In
Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967), the Utah Supreme
Court recognized a tort cause of action by an insured against his insurer for breach of an
-16-

obligation to bargain fairly in a third party context. Ammerman explained that an insurer has
a fiduciary duty to defend its insured and that a breach of that duty gives rise to a separate
cause of action for the insured against the insurer. The injured third party, however, is barred
from suing the insurer because there is no privity of contract and the insurer owes the third
party no duty. Id. at 577.
In Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court held that an insured may sue his insurer for failure to deal fairly and in good faith in
a first-party relationship and that the action is based on contract, not tort. The term "firstparty" refers to an insurance agreement where the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to
it by the insured for losses suffered by the insured. The term "third-party" refers to situations
where the insurer contracts to defend the insured against claims made by third parties against
the insured and to pay resulting liability up to a specified limit. Id. at 798, n.2.
Importantly, in both the first and third party contexts, a "bad faith" claim is derived
from the insurance contract. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises out
of the contract and runs to the benefit of only those who are parties to the contract. Cannon
is not a party to the contract with Travelers and has no contractual relationship with
Travelers.
B. Cannon Is Not An Insured Under The Travelers Policy, But Instead A Claimant
Who Made a Claim For Medical Expenses. The Andersons9 Policy Included Medical
Payments Coverage As Part Of The Liability Coverages Granted To The Andersons.
Cannon claims that she was injured while she was a guest at the Anderson home and
that she was therefore entitled to certain medical benefits under the Andersons' insurance
policy. Cannon did not make a claim of negligence against the Andersons, but bases her
claim for medical expenses on a provision in the Andersons' policy which provides coverage
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for necessary medical expenses to others who are injured on the Andersons' premises.
"Coverage F-Medical Payments To Others" is included as part of the liability coverages
provided to the Andersons. It is part of "SECTION II-LIABILITY COVERAGES."
(R.166 and Addendum 4 at p.26.) This medical payments to others coverage is an added
benefit provided to the Andersons, providing payment of medical expenses to others in
certain circumstances, without considering fault. The primary purpose for this type of
coverage is to benefit the Andersons, as the homeowners, by providing a means for the
insurer to pay relatively small, easily ascertainable medical expenses without a determination
of fault. This may eliminate certain small claims that would otherwise be made against the
insureds. See Zegar v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 570N.E.2d 1176 (111. App. 1991) where a slip
and fall claimant brought a claim under a medical payments provision of a policy insuring
the Sears premises. The court determined that the coverage was primarily for the benefit of
the contracting parties and that there was nothing in the policy stating or suggesting that the
claimant could sue the insurer.
Importantly, there is nothing in Coverage F stating that a party injured on the named
insureds' premises is an insured, and nothing grants such an injured person the right to sue
Travelers. Further, Cannon, as a person claiming to have been injured on the Andersons'
premises, is not defined as and does not qualify as an insured under the definitions of the
policy. The terms "you" and "your" are defined on page 1 of the policy to mean the named
insured shown in the declarations and the spouse if a resident of the same household. (R. 153
and Addendum 4 at p.l.) The declarations page of the policy designates the named insured
as Aldon Scott and Jesselie Barlow Anderson. (R. 1166 at Ex. 1 and Addendum 4.) The term
"insured" is defined on page 1 of the policy to mean "you [the Andersons] and residents of
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your household" and other specified persons with regard to the operation of vehicles.
Cannon does not qualify as an "insured" under the definitions. Cannon argues that certain
duties are imposed upon an injured person in order to obtain medical payments and that no
duties could be imposed unless the claimant were an insured. Cannon cites no authority for
this statement. Obviously, if medical payments are going to be made to anyone, the insurer
must have some proof concerning the claim. As expressly stated in the policy, the proof can
be provided by the injured person or someone acting for the injured person. The fact that
Travelers requires proof of the medical expenses, does not make the injured person an
insured.
Cannon asserts that she is an "unnamed insured" or "first-party insured" under the
Travelers policy. It makes no difference how Cannon characterizes herself; she is not
defined as or included as an insured under the policy. Aldon Scott and Jesselie Barlow
Anderson are designated as the "named insureds" on the declarations page of the policy.
Accordingly, they are the only named insureds. Other unnamed "insureds" are specifically
defined in the policy to mean "residents of your household" and other specified persons with
regard to the operation of vehicles. Some persons qualifying under the definition as an
"insured" are not specifically named, but are specified as residents of the named insured's
household and other specifically defined persons. The fact that some insureds are unnamed
has no significance in this matter. What is significant is that Cannon does not fall within any
of the definitions of "insured" under the policy. She is neither the named insured nor an
"insured." Cannon's argument that she is an insured, but simply unnamed, is contrary to the
policy language and is unsupported. This unsupported argument is simply an attempt to
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create a contractual relationship where none exists.1
Cannon further argues that Travelers claims adjuster, Mr. Tom Day, admitted that the
policy gave first-party coverage to unnamed insureds. In the context of Day's deposition
testimony, it can be seen that Mr. Day was acknowledging that a child or a resident of the
named insured's household could make a first-party coverage claim as an insured under the
policy, even though they are not the "named insured" under the policy. (R. 1166, at pp.40,
41.)
The policy language is clear and unambiguous. Cannon is not defined as an insured.
The coverage for medical payments to others is part of the liability coverages purchased by
the Andersons for the Andersons' protection. There is nothing granting an injured person
the right to sue Travelers for the medical payments, and there is nothing that makes Cannon
a party to the insurance contract or that creates contractual privity between Travelers and
Cannon.
C. Cannon's Argument That The Definition Of Insured Uses Words That Are Inclusive
And The Definition Is Thereby Ambiguous Has Been Raised For The First Time On
Appeal And Should Not Be Considered By This Court, The Argument Is Furthermore
Erroneous.
Cannon argues that by including any ADDITIONAL INSURED within the definition
of insured for purposes of sections I and II of the policy, the definition of insured becomes

1

Cannon is also in error in her reference to other policy provisions, arguing that
other individuals or entities are provided coverage without being defined as "insured."
(See Appellant's Brief, p. 18, n.2.) As an example, Cannon references page 33 of the
policy where "damage to property of others" is an additional coverage. This coverage is
very clearly part of the liability coverage and applies when the damage is caused by an
insured. Cannon also reaches erroneous conclusions on the other references. Further, the
other references are inapplicable here as they relate to the property insurance section of
the policy. As noted, the medical payments provision is part of the liability section.
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ambiguous. Cannon's argument is that by defining "insured" under sections I and II to
include any additional insured, the term "include" allows for Cannon to be considered an
insured since the term include is one of enlargement rather than restriction. While this
argument is erroneous, it should not be considered on appeal for the first time. It was not
raised below in any of the memoranda filed by Cannon. It is fundamental that the trial court
should have the first opportunity to address issues later raised on appeal, and that the
appellate court should decline to consider arguments raised for the first time at the appellate
level. Smith v. Iversen. 848 P.2d 677 (Utah 1993). One exception to this rule of appellate
review is that the appellate court may affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground, even
though the trial court assigned another reason for its ruling. Thus, an argument made for the
first time on appeal will be considered if it will result in affirmance, but will not be
considered if it will result in reversal. See State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah
App. 1991). One reason for this rule has been stated by the Utah Supreme Court as follows:
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final settlement of
controversies, requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory
or theories of recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot
thereafter change to some different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion
a merry-go-round of litigation.
Bundv v. Century Equip. Co.. 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), quoting from Simpson v.
General Motors Corp.. 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970).
Whether the point raised by Cannon is characterized as a new argument or a new issue
makes no difference. See Ong International (USA) v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455,
n.31 (Utah 1993). It should also be noted that the injection of new issues of fact into a case
on appeal is improper and is reason to reject consideration of the issue. Zions First Nat.
Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). Under sound rules of appellate
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review, Cannon's new argument that the definition of insured is ambiguous and that she may
therefore fall within the definition, should not be considered.
Even if the court considers Cannon's new argument, the argument misreads plain
language of the policy and is simply erroneous. Cannon's argument refers to subparagraph
e. of the definition of insured, which states as follows:
Under sections I and II, "insured" also includes:
e. Any ADDITIONAL INSURED named in the Declarations
but only with respect to Coverages A, B, E, and F and only for
the "residence premises".
(See policy p.2, R.154 and Addendum 4.) Cannon first argues that under this definition,
anyone named in the declarations is also an insured, which would have no meaning under
coverage F for medical payments, since the "named insureds" are excluded from receiving
benefits under coverage F. This argument blatantly misreads the policy language, by
replacing the words "additional insured" with the words "named insured." There are simply
no "additional insureds" listed in the declarations of the Andersons' policy.

If the

declarations did list additional insureds, they would be included as insureds under Section
I and II.
Cannon also apparently attempts to imply that she may be one of many insureds
"included" within the definition of insured since the term "includes" is an inclusive term
rather than an exclusive term. This argument again misreads plain language. As used in the
above quoted provision, the term "includes" indeed enlarges the persons qualifying as
insureds to include "any ADDITIONAL INSURED" named in the declarations. It enlarges
the definition to include additional insureds named in the declarations in addition to those
insureds defined in the preceding definitions. The definitions are clear and unambiguous and
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should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. Cannon is plainly and simply not an
insured under the policy. Furthermore, Cannon is not entitled to have any alleged ambiguity
construed in her lavor in determining whether she is an insured. Aetna v. Aztec Plumbing,
796 P.2d at 229. Cannon's argument that she is an "unnamed insured" or "first-party
insured" should be rejected.
D. Cannon Does Not Have The Requisite Contractual Relationship With Travelers To
State A Claim for Alleged "Bad Faith/9
Cannon argues that she is a first-party insured in an attempt to create some type of
contractual relationship with Travelers. As demonstrated above, Cannon does not qualify
as an insured whatsoever under the Travelers policy. Moreover, Cannon's argument misses
the point. Cannon is not a party to the insurance contract between the Andersons and
Travelers. There is no contractual relationship between Cannon and Travelers. She did not
pay premiums and had no knowledge of the existence of the policy, and more specifically,
no knowledge of the medical payments to others coverage, at the time of the alleged incident.
Utah's appellate courts have consistently required contractual privity before recognizing an
insurance "bad faith" claim. In acknowledging such claims in both Ammerman and Beck,
the Utah Supreme Court's analysis made clear that the claim is derived from the insurance
contract and is dependent upon the contractual relationship. After Beck, the Utah Court of
Appeals reviewed a claim by an automobile accident victim against the tort-feasor's insurer,
alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Pixton v. State
Farm, 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). The Court of Appeals first reiterated the rule that "in
order to maintain an action under a contractual theory of insurer bad faith, the parties must
be in privity of contract at the time of the alleged wrong." Pixton. at 749 (citing Arnica Mut.
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Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), also citing Ammennan.) The Pixton
court concluded that the injured party did not have a claim for breach of the implied covenant
under either Beck or Ammerman and therefore could not bring such a claim.
Thus, under Beck, State Farm owes Pixton no duty as there is no relevant
contractual relationship. Neither is there a duty under Ammerman as there is
no fiduciary relationship based on a covenant to defend.
Pixton, at 749.
Cannon suggests that the Utah cases do not cover the precise legal issue in this case
and attempts to distinguish the several Utah cases that have addressed the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Cannon goes so far as to suggest that this case is most similar
to the case of Campbell v. State Farm, 840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992). In Campbell it was
held that State Farm breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured when a
third-party claim was made and an excess judgment was obtained against the insured.
Campbell thus involved a fiduciary relationship based upon a covenant to defend. Campbell
has no similarity to the instant matter.
Cannon ultimately urges this court to ignore Utah law and look to the law of other
states, such as California. Cannon argues that privity of contract is not a requirement to
allege a claim of insurer bad faith and has gone so far as to criticize the Utah Court of
Appeals as being "off base" and stretching earlier rulings by requiring privity of contract in
the case of Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. R.267. Despite Cannon's dissatisfaction with
Utah law on this subject, the statement made in Arnica represents the law of the state of Utah
and has been cited and reaffirmed by Utah's appellate courts on subsequent occasions. The
Utah courts have held strictly to the rule that in order to maintain an action for insurer bad
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faith, the parties must be in privity of contract. Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court
addressed this issue in a worker's compensation context in Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908
P.2d 862 (Utah 1995), affirming Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 130 (Utah App.
1994). Savage involved a claim by an injured employee against his employer's worker's
compensation insurer for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme
Court stated:
We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that an action for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be brought only by a party to the
insurance contract. This conclusion flows naturally from the decisions of this
court in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), and
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967).
Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
The injured employee in Savage argued that she had a contractual relationship with
the insurer due to a statute requiring all worker's compensation insurance policies to contain
a provision that employees may enforce, in their own name, the liability of the insurer. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and held, despite the statutory and contractual right
to sue the insurer directly, that because the employee had no contractual relationship with the
insurer, she had no cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
or so called "bad faith." IdL at 866-7.
The Supreme Court in Savage also addressed the practical impossibility of placing a
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing upon the insurer running toward both its
insured and the injured third party. The court stated that:
If. . . Educators [the insurer] were deemed to owe Savage [the claimant] a
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Educators would have an
unresolvable conflict between its contractually-based duty to the district [its
insured] and its so-called "contractual" duty to Savage. An insurer cannot be
expected to zealously protect the interests of two parties with diametrically
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opposed interests.
Id. at 866. See also Pixton, where the Utah Court of Appeals quoted the Alaska Supreme
Court in stating that an insurer could hardly have a fiduciary relationship both with the
insured and a claimant because the interests of the two are often conflicting. Pixton, at 750.
The instant case presents the same problem. If Travelers were deemed to owe Cannon a
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Travelers would have an unresolvable conflict
between its contractually based duties to the Andersons, who purchased the policy, and its
so-called "contractual" duty to Cannon.
Utah's appellate courts have held steadfastly to the rule that no cause of action for
"bad faith" exists absent contractual privity. On occasion, the Utah courts have characterized
this as a requisite contractual relationship, sometimes referring to privity of contract, and
sometimes referring to contractual relationship. The Utah Supreme Court most recently
stated the rule clearly in Savage, indicating that the claimant must be a party to the contract.
At the very least, the Utah courts have required a direct contractual relationship. Cannon
recognizes that this rule, firmly established by both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
Court of Appeals, means that she does not have a claim against Travelers for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She has therefore attempted to minimize the
statements of the Utah Court of Appeals and persuade this Court that none of the Utah cases
outlining the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing govern this matter. To the contrary,
the Utah decisions fully outline the scope of the duty and require contractual privity or a
direct contractual relationship. Cannon does not have either in this matter and her claim
against Travelers fails.
Cannon goes to great lengths to characterize herself as an "unnamed insured" and a
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"first-party insured." This is an attempt to put herself in the same class as persons who
qualify as insureds under the policy, such as resident relatives. While it might be argued that
certain "insureds" under the policy have a contractual relationship by virtue of being defined
as an insured, Cannon does not qualify as such. Such insureds might include permissive
users of automobiles under an automobile policy, resident relatives of the household, and
other persons qualifying under the policy definitions as insureds. In the instant matter,
Cannon does not so qualify. Her characterization of herself as an unnamed and/or first-party
insured does not make her an insured under the policy and does not make her a party to the
contract.
Other courts have refused to extend the bad faith claim to "strangers" to the insurance
contract. See Messina v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.. 998 F.2d 2,5 (D.C. Cir. 1993) and cases
cited therein.

See also, Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W. 2d 769 (Neb. 1991)

(disapproved on other grounds in Wortman v. Unger. 578 N.W.2d 413 (Neb. 1993), where
the Nebraska Supreme Court explained the difference between policy holder beneficiaries
and non-policy holder beneficiaries. The Nebraska court explained that the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is premised upon the contractual relationship, and that beneficiaries of
the policy who are not policy holders should not have a claim for "bad faith."
Utah's appellate courts have held firmly to the rule that no cause of action for "bad
faith" exists absent contractual privity, despite the fact that certain other courts have
recognized the duty in the absence of contractual privity. (See Justice Durham's dissent in
Savage v. Educators Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d at 868-9.) The Utah Supreme Court's requirement
of contractual privity in Savage governs the instant case. Despite a statutory and contractual
right of the employee to sue the insurer directly in Savage, the Supreme Court held that the
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employee had no cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Thus, despite the appearance of a contractual relationship and an expressed
contractual right to sue, the court held that the employee was "not in privity" and concluded
that because the employee "is not in privity with Educators, she has no cause of action
against Educators for so-called bad faith adjusting of her worker's compensation claim."
Savage, at 867.
Like Savage, Cannon has no direct contractual relationship or contractual privity with
Travelers. Cannon argues that she has some claim for medical payments coverage under the
policy, which she argues gives her some contractual relationship. In Savage, the injured
employee had a contractual and statutory right to sue the insurer for benefits, but this was
insufficient to create the contractual privity necessary to bring a cause of action for bad faith.
Since Cannon is not a party to the contract, her claim for bad faith fails under wellestablished Utah law.
IV. CANNON'S ALLEGED THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY STATUS DOES NOT
MAKE HER A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT AND DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO THE
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
Cannon argues that she is an intended beneficiary under the contract of insurance and
thereby entitled to sue on the contract, citing as support Peterson v. Western Casualty &
Surety Co.. 19 Utah 2d 26, 425 P.2d 769 (1967). In Peterson, however, the insurance
contract itself contained a provision that a judgment creditor of the insured could bring a suit
to compel payment of the judgment. As such, the plaintiff in Peterson was a third-party
beneficiary of the contract expressly entitled to bring suit. The Travelers policy does not
authorize a person such as Cannon to bring a suit on the policy. Under Utah law, a thirdparty does not have enforceable rights under a contract unless that party is an intended
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beneficiary and the intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit
is clear. Ron Case Roofing v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989). One only
incidentally benefitted by the contract may not maintain an action against the promisor. Id.
As a general matter, an injured party is not treated as a third-party beneficiary under the tortfeasor's insurance contract. Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737, 740 (Utah 1982).
While Cannon did not assert a negligence claim against the Andersons, the possibility for
such a claim existed.
The case of Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety. 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993) is an
example of a case where one may benefit from a contract but not be entitled to sue thereon.
In Broadwater, the Supreme Court held that a third-party beneficiary to a bond, purchased
on the chance that a lost stock certificate would be found, could not sue on the bond even
though she was the lawful owner of the missing stock certificate. The Supreme Court stated
that "nothing in the bond indicates that Fletcher or Northwestern [the parties to the bond]
intended to confer on plaintiff the right to enforce payment." Id. at 537. Thus, although the
plaintiff in Broadwater benefitted from the bond, the bond did not provide her with a right
to enforce payment. She was therefore deemed an incidental beneficiary, who was not
entitled to sue on the bond.
Likewise, in Savage, the injured employee had a contractual, as well as a statutory,
right to sue the insurer for benefits, but this was an insufficient contractual relationship to
allow a cause of action for bad faith. Savage, at 866-7.
Cannon may benefit from the medical payments coverage in the Travelers policy, but
is not provided with a right of action against Travelers. The primary purpose of the medical
payments coverage is to benefit the insured, the Andersons, under the policy by providing
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for the payment of relatively small medical expenses when persons are injured on the
premises, regardless of fault. See Zegar, 570 N.E.2d at 1179, where medical payments
coverage was stated to be primarily for the benefit of the contracting parties and only
incidentally for injured claimants. Moreover, even if Cannon is deemed an intended thirdparty beneficiary of the medical payments coverage, Travelers submits that the intended
benefit is only to the extent of the medical payments coverage limits. There is still no
contractual privity and no contractual relationship with Travelers, and the third-party
beneficiary would not have a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. If Cannon is deemed an intended third-party beneficiary, the intended
benefit is the payment of the medical expenses, no more. There is certainly no indication in
the policy to provide Cannon or other potential medical payments claimants who are not
insureds, with any of the implied covenants flowing only between the parties to the contract.
A case similar to the instant matter was recently decided by the South Carolina Court
of Appeals. In Klecklev v. Northwestern Natl. Casualty Co.. 498 S.E. 2d 669 (S.C. App.
1998), the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries in a fall while on the premises of WW
Services. Northwestern insured the premises with a policy that covered up to $5,000 in
medical expenses, regardless of fault. The plaintiff brought an action directly against
Northwestern for payment of the medical expenses and for bad faith refusal to pay benefits
she was allegedly due. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
plaintiff did not have standing to sue, holding that the plaintiff did not have a right to assert
a claim for bad faith against the insurer because the plaintiff was not a party to the policy of
insurance. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the South Carolina Supreme Court had
recently recognized a cause of action for bad faith refusal to pay first party benefits under an
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insurance contract, but stated that the "cause of action does not extend to a person who is not
a party to or a named insured under the insurance contract and who possesses a mere
contingent interest, such as an inchoate dower interest, in the property insured." Kleckley,
at 671, quoting Carter v. American Mutual Fire Ins. Co.. 307 S.E. 2d 225, 227 (S.C. 1983).
Cannon's asserted third-party beneficiary status does not make her a party to the
contract. A third-party beneficiary is "one for whose benefit a promise is made in a contract
but who is not a party to the contract." Blacks Law Dictionary. (5th Ed.). Third-party
beneficiaries are those "recognized as having enforceable rights created in them by a contract
to which they are not parties and for which they give no consideration." Broadwater, at 536.
See also Hunt v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii. 922 P.2d 976, 980 (Haw. App. 1996). A thirdparty beneficiary is not a party to the contract, and the beneficiary should not have a right to
claim a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that runs only between
parties to the contract. The rights of the third-party beneficiary should be strictly limited to
the benefit that the parties to the contract intended to confer, which is simply the payment
of medical expenses.

V. THE OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON BY CANNON ARE NOT
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW.
Cannon relies upon cases from other jurisdictions and cites to other alleged legal
authorities for the proposition that med pay claimants should be entitled to assert a bad faith
claim. The case law and other authorities relied upon by Cannon are readily distinguished
or are inconsistent with Utah law on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing It
must be emphasized that Utah's approach to the implied covenant and the so-called insurer
bad faith claim is different than the approach taken by other states. The Utah Supreme Court
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specifically rejected the approach taken by the majority of states. In Beck, 701 P.2d 795
(Utah 1985), the court rejected the majority position which permitted an insured in a "first
party" situation to institute a tort action against an insurer. IdL at 798. The Utah courts have
specifically tied the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the contractual
relationship existing between the contracting parties. Id at 800; and Savage v. Educators Ins.
Co., 908 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1995). Cannon's reliance upon case law from other
jurisdictions and other authorities is therefore misplaced.
It is also important that in Utah, a third-party does not have enforceable rights under
a contract unless that party is an intended beneficiary. The intent of the contracting parties
to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear. Ron Case Roofing v. Blomquist 773
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989). A person may benefit from the contract, but be considered
only an incidental beneficiary who is not entitled to sue on the contract. Id In the instant
matter, Cannon may benefit from the medical payments provision in the Travelers policy,
but is not provided with a right to sue on the policy. Cannon's benefit is incidental, as the
primary benefit of the medical payments coverage is for the insureds who contracted for the
benefit. Even if Cannon is deemed to be an intended third-party beneficiary of the medical
payments coverage, the intended benefit is only that medical expenses by paid. There is no
indication in the contract that the contracting parties, Travelers and the Andersons, intended
to confer the separate and distinct benefit of the implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing that exist only between parties to the contract. Most importantly, even if Cannon is
deemed a third-party beneficiary of the medical payments coverage, Cannon still has no
contractual privity with Travelers and is therefore not entitled to make a claim for insurer bad
faith under Utah law. gee Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 430 P.2d 576 (Utah
-32-

1967); Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P,2d 795 (Utah 1985); Pixton v. State
Farm. 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991); Savage v. Educators Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d 862 (Utah
1995).
The cases set forth by Cannon do not represent Utah law and should not be followed.
Even if they are followed to the extent of deeming Cannon a third-party beneficiary to the
medical payments coverage, however, contractual privity is still lacking and Cannon should
not be entitled to assert an insurance bad faith claim under Utah law. The cases relied upon
by Cannon are nevertheless readily distinguished on their facts or the particular state law at
issue.
In Donald v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.. 18 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1994) the court determined
under Indiana law that a claimant to medical payment benefits was a third-party beneficiary
to those benefits and could sue to enforce that provision of the contract. The court further
held that the insurer owed the third-party beneficiary the same duty of good faith and fair
dealing that it would owe its insured in Indiana. The court so held despite acknowledging
that persons entitled to medical payment benefits under the contract were not "insureds"
under the contract. Id. at 478. This determination is contrary to the law set forth in Utah
which requires privity of contract or a direct contractual relationship to make a claim for
breach of the implied covenant. It should further be noted that Indiana follows the majority
rule allowing a tort cause of action for bad faith in first-party cases, completely contrary to
Utah law. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman bv Smith. 622 N.E. 2d 515 (Ind. 1993), and Ashley,
Bad Faith Actions §2:15 (2d ed. 1997).
The case of Donaldson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 947 F.Supp. 429 (D. Hawaii 1996)
involved a claim for automobile no-fault insurance benefits under Hawaii law. The covered
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person was not defined as an insured in the no-fault insurance statute, but the court found that
he was "essentially an insured" and therefore allowed the bad faith cause of action. Id. at
431. Under Utah law, a no-fault insurance claimant is an insured and entitled to sue by virtue
of statute and also the policy language. It is also significant that the Hawaii court held that
third-party beneficiaries of an insurance contract are entitled to the same benefits under the
contract as insureds. This is contrary to Utah law, which has consistently required
contractual privity. Further, Hawaii also follows the majority view, allowing a tort cause of
action in first-party bad faith cases. See Best Place, Inc. v. Penn America Ins. Co., 920 P.2d
334 (Haw. 1996).
Interestingly, in another Hawaii case, decided by the Hawaii Court of Appeals, a med
pay claimant was found to be an intended third-party beneficiary of the med pay coverage,
but the trial court's granting of summary judgment to the insurer on the bad faith claim was
apparently affirmed. In Hunt v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 922 P.2d 976 (Haw. App. 1996),
the Court of Appeals indicated that it was vacating that part of the order granting summary
judgment that precluded the breach of contract claim, but affirmed all other parts of the
order. Id at 986. The court stated that the rights of the third-party beneficiary must be
limited to the terms of the promise. Id. at 980.
The case of Harper v. Wausau Ins. Corp., 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 64 (Cal. App. 1997) also
relied upon by Cannon, is based upon California law. Beck specifically rejected the
approach taken by the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d
1032 (Cal. 1973). Beck, at 798. It must be further noted that Harper did not address the
issue of whether the plaintiff would have a bad faith claim, but merely found that the plaintiff
was a third-party beneficiary of a medical payments provision. Interestingly, the Harper
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court acknowledged that the California Supreme Court holds that "a third-party should not
be permitted to enforce covenants made not for his benefit, but rather for others. He is not
a contracting party; his right to performance is predicated on the contracting parties' intent
to benefit him." Harper, at 68.
In Cancino v. Farmers Ins. Group, 145 Cal.Rptr. 503 (Cal. App. 1978) the California
Court analyzed a claim made by an insured under the uninsured motorist coverage of the
policy. The plaintiff in Cancino fell within the policy definition of insured. Likewise, in
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers, 143 Cal.Rptr. 415 (Cal. App. 1978), the court found
that a permissive user of an automobile fell within the policy definition of insured. These
cases have no bearing on the instant matter. First, they are based upon California law, which
has been expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Second, the cases involved persons
who were defined as "insureds" under the insurance contract and were therefore in an
arguable contractual relationship with the insurer.
In Prvgrocki v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Co.. 407 So.2d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981),
the Florida court was determining whether or not a pedestrian entitled to personal injury
protection coverage under a policy was entitled to recover attorney's fees under a particular
Florida statute. In State Farm v. Kambara. 667 So.2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) the Florida
court again was analyzing whether or not a person was entitled to attorney's fees under the
Florida statute. The court determined that the plaintiff qualified as an omnibus insured under
the Florida statute entitling omnibus insureds to attorney's fees. The Florida courts
apparently distinguish between omnibus insureds who are entitled to attorney's fees under
the statute and third-party beneficiaries who are not so entitled. See Kambara. at 832, n.l.
There is no similar statute under Utah law and these cases have no bearing on this matter.
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Cannon also relies upon the case of Hammond v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co.. 1994 WL
521193 (Ohio App. 1994). Hammond apparently stands for the proposition in Ohio that a
beneficiary of medical payments coverage may bring an action against the insurer for bad
faith. Hammond is not in line with Utah cases outlining the insurance bad faith claim. An
insurers duty of good faith and fair dealing in Ohio does not arise because of the contractual
relationship between the insurer and the insured. Further, a breach of the duty gives rise to
a cause of action in tort against the insurer. Both of these concepts are completely contrary
to Utah law as stated in Beck and its progeny.
Cannon further argues that a claim for med pay is similar to a claim for no-fault
benefits or uninsured motorist coverage under an automobile policy. There is a crucial
difference between no-fault benefits and uninsured motorist coverage under an automobile
policy and med pay benefits under the subject Travelers policy. Under Utah law, no-fault
coverage [personal injury protection coverage] and uninsured motorist coverage are required
components of motor vehicle insurance policies. See Utah Code Ann. §§31A-22-302(2),
305, 306. As such, a person entitled to no-fault benefits or uninsured motorist coverage is
an insured by statute and by definition in the policy.
VI. THE UNFAIR CLAIM SETTLEMENT PRACTICES STATUTES AND RULES,
INDUSTRY STANDARDS, EXPERT TESTIMONY AND OTHER ALLEGED
LEGAL AUTHORITIES CANNOT CREATE THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
Utah case law has established when the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing exists. The Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Rule does not create any private cause
of action. Likewise, industry standards and expert opinion cannot establish when the implied
duty arises.

-36-

A. The Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Statutes And Rules Do Not Give Rise To A
Claim For Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing.
The fourth cause of action of plaintiff s first amended complaint was based upon the
unfair claims settlement practices statute found in Utah Code Ann. §31A-26-303 and the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Rule promulgated by the Insurance Commission in Rule
590-89-1 et seq., Utah Administrative Code. Travelers denies Cannon's allegations that the
statutes and rules were violated. However, even if violated, the statutes and rules do not give
rise to a private cause of action and do not create a duty of good faith and fair dealing, which
duty arises only between parties to the insurance contract.
The statutes and rules relied upon by Cannon are regulatory in nature and enforcement
thereof is strictly for the Insurance Commission. Section 31A-26-303 of the Utah Code
expressly states in subsection (5) that "this section does not create any private cause of
action." Similarly, the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Rule states, under the section
defining the scope of the rule, that "this rule is regulatory in nature and is not intended to
create a private right of action." See R590-89-3, Utah Administrative Code.
Even the California Supreme Court, which at one time held that a private cause of
action could be stated under the California Unfair Claims Settlement Practices statute, has
since reversed its position. In Moradi-Shalal v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co.. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal.
1988), the California Supreme court overruled its earlier decision in Royal Globe Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979). In Moradi-Shalal the California Supreme
Court acknowledged that 17 of 19 states considering the issue had refused to recognize a
private cause of action arising out of the statutes and rules adopted in the various states from
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Model Unfair Claims Practices Act.
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Moradi-Shalal at 63. See also Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233,
235 (Minn. 1986), where the Minnesota court stated that the great majority of state versions
of the model act have been held not to create a private cause of action.
Cannon may not utilize the unfair claims settlement practices statutes and rules to
establish a claim for bad faith. The statutes and rules do not give rise to a private cause of
action and do not establish a legal duty where none exists otherwise. Cannon references a
footnote in Beck indicating that in some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may
also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract, where the court noted that
there may be statutory requirements that give rise to independent causes of action.
Importantly, Beck acknowledged that the duties and obligations between the parties to the
contract are contractual rather than fiduciary, and without more, a breach of those implied
or expressed duties gives rise to only a cause of action in contract. Beck, at 800. The court's
footnote seemingly acknowledges that there may be intentional torts that could arise
independently of the contract. The footnote in Beck has absolutely no application to the
instant matter.
Cannon again inaccurately describes testimony from Tom Day, asserting that
Travelers testified that any violation, omission, or deviation of such standards would
constitute improper claims handling and violations of its own standards. Mr. Day simply
testified that the regulations deal with appropriate claims handling, and that Travelers' claim
representatives are trained to handle claims properly and fairly. R.l 166 at p. 15-19.
Cannon's citation to the Insurance Fraud Act, Utah Code Ann. §31A-31-103, is also
misguided. The Insurance Fraud Act, by its terms, does not abrogate or modify common
law, but likewise does not create any civil legal duties where none previously existed.
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Moreover, there is no evidence that Travelers violated the act, and the act is wholly
inapplicable to this matter.
B, Industry Standards And Expert Opinions Do Not Create The Implied Covenant Of
Good Faith And Fair Dealing.
Cannon argues that it is the industry standard to treat unnamed insureds as first-party
claimants with all the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. Whether or not this is
industry standard has no relevance to the pending issues. Whether or not the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing existed between Travelers and Cannon is a question of law for
the court. Cf. First Security Bank v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). The
duty of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law is dependent upon contractual privity or
a direct contractual relationship. Cannon argues that Travelers admitted that unnamed
insureds are owed the same duties of fair and proper claims handling as are owed to named
insureds, citing to the deposition of Travelers' claims adjuster, Thomas Day. Mr. Day's
testimony explained that a resident relative of the named insured's household could qualify
as an "insured" under the policy and have a first party claim in certain instances. R.l 166 at
40-42. Cannon has attempted to categorize herself as an "unnamed insured" in order to make
herself an insured under the policy when she does not qualify as such under the definitions.
Some persons qualifying as "insureds" under the definitions are not specifically named, but
are specified as residents of the named insured's household and other specifically defined
persons. Cannon does not fall within any of the definitions of "insured". She is neither the
named insured nor an "insured," named or unnamed.
Cannon also relies upon testimony by her expert witness, Gary Fye. Fye's testimony
should not be considered by this court, as it is replete with unsubstantiated opinions,
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argumentative statements and legal conclusions. See Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,859
(Utah 1983): and Gaw v. State bv and through DOT. 798 P.2d 1130.1137 (Utah App. 1990).
Travelers hereby incorporates by reference its Motion to Strike Affidavit Testimony and
supporting memoranda. (R. 1030-1040; 1125-1133.) Furthermore, expert testimony cannot
create a legal duty between Travelers and Cannon. The duties are created by contract and
by law, and the existence or lack of a duty is a question of law for the court. Cannon again
inaccurately cites to the record asserting that Travelers has admitted that such industry
standards are proper and have been made a part of Travelers own internal policies. Cannon's
assertion is unsupported by the record.
Regardless of the inadmissibility of the affidavit of Gary Fye, the testimony of Gary
Fye, and the testimony of other witnesses cannot create a legal duty where none exists. The
statements and opinions by Mr. Fye, even if admissible, assume the existence of a legal duty.
Fye can testify only to an alleged breach of duty once a legal duty has been determined by
the court.
Cannon further improperly relies upon three alleged experts citing to a treatise on
insurance bad faith litigation. Cannon cites this court to Shernoff, Gage, Levine, Insurance
Bad Faith Litigation, for the proposition that "since the duty of good faith and fair dealing
arises from an insurers relationship to its insured, rather than its status as a party to the
contract, the scope of that duty is not strictly defined by the terms of the contract." This
statement by the authors, Shernoff, Gage and Levine, is directly contrary to Utah law on the
issue and should be summarily rejected. Furthermore, none of the authors' opinions
represent legal authority. In fact, the treatise merely represents opinions by three California
lawyers who advocate insurance bad faith claims. See Shernoff, Gage, Levine, Insurance
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Bad Faith Litigation, p.xix.
In summary, Cannon suggests that this court follow the opinions of so-called experts
in the industry as opposed to the well-established Utah law on the issue of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Cannon relies upon expert opinion and the law of
other jurisdictions to advocate a change in Utah law, as the established law in this state does
not allow Cannon to assert a claim against Travelers for bad faith. This case is governed by
Utah law and the other authorities relied upon by Cannon should be rejected.
VII. THE VALIDITY OF CANNON'S CLAIM WAS FAIRLY DEBATABLE,
THEREBY ELIMINATING ANY CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH.
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the duties attendant to the duty of good faith and
fair dealing in Beck. Beck further established a fairly debatable defense to a claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Billings, at 465. Thus, when an
insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to
have breached the implied covenant. Id The court further held that the duty of good faith
runs both ways - that the insured and the insurer have parallel obligations to perform the
contract in good faith. Beck, at 801.
Travelers submits that Cannon cannot assert a claim for alleged breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Cannon was not a party to the contract with
Travelers. Even assuming contractual privity between Cannon and Travelers, however,
Cannon's claim was fairly debatable, and Travelers was entitled to debate it and cannot be
held to have breached the implied covenant. Furthermore, Cannon would have owed a
parallel duty of good faith and fair dealing and breached any such duty by intentionally
withholding any information about the claim and her alleged injury from both Travelers and
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Travelers' insureds, the Andersons. It is undisputed that Cannon avoided mentioning the
alleged injury to the Andersons in order to maintain a friendly relationship so that Cannon's
family might benefit from the Andersons' testimony in unrelated litigation involving the
estate of Cannon's sister. Cannon avoided telling the Andersons of any problem for several
months and notice of the alleged claim to Travelers was delayed even further. Cannon
withheld any mention of the incident or of any alleged pain or injury despite having seen the
Andersons socially between the date of the incident and Cannon's surgery. This withholding
of information combined with the fact that Jesselie Anderson noticed nothing amiss either
at the time of the incident or thereafter, caused the Andersons to question how the injury
could be due to the greeting incident between Cannon and the Andersons' ten year old
daughter at their home. This scenario also caused Travelers to question the claim. In
response, Cannon provided only a letter from her doctor which indicated that her condition
"could have" been related to the incident in August 1992.
Travelers submits that even if Travelers and Cannon shared contractual privity,
Cannon breached her parallel duty of good faith. More importantly, the claim was fairly
debatable. The nature of the incident itself gave rise to a fair debate. Cannon's actions in
intentionally withholding information from Travelers and the Andersons furthered the
debatable nature of the claim. As such, Travelers cannot be held to have breached any
alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing. In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838
(Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment
to an insurer based upon the fairly debatable defense in a first party bad faith action. The
court stated:
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If the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there
exists a debatable reason for denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the
claim, and eliminating the bad faith claim. "When a claim is fairly debatable,
the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter of fact
or law." [citation omitted]
Id. at 842 (emphasis added).
In the case of Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263 (Utah App. 1993) the Court
of Appeals again determined that an insurer's position was fairly debatable as a matter of law
and that the first party insured's bad faith claim failed. Id. at 266. Most recently, the Utah
Supreme Court in Billings stated that, "whether an insured's claim is fairly debatable under
a given set of facts is also a question of law." Billings, at 464.
Cannon's claim that her medical expenses were necessitated by the incident at the
Anderson home was fairly debatable as a matter of law. The nature of the incident itself gave
rise to a fairly debatable issue. Cannon claimed that her herniated disc and subsequent
surgery were necessitated by an incident where the Andersons' ten year old daughter threw
her arms around Cannon as Cannon bent over to hug her. Cannon failed to express any
discomfort or pain at the time although she claimed later to have been in immediate pain.
Jesselie Anderson, who was present at the time of the greeting incident, noticed nothing
amiss and questioned the relationship of Cannon's back condition to the incident. (R. 166 at
pp.89,90.) Cannon then continued to withhold any information from the Andersons for
several months in order to maintain favor with them as witnesses in other litigation. When
Cannon presented her claim to Travelers and the dispute concerning the claim could not be
resolved, Cannon filed suit. Travelers claims adjuster, Mr. Day, obtained records from
Cannon's physician, Dr. Hecht. He also obtained a statement from the treating physician,
Dr. J. Lynn Smith, which indicated only that the incident in August of 1992 could have
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subsequently led to the disc rupture and surgical intervention. None of the evidence
indicated a likelihood or probability that Cannon's back condition was caused by the August
1992 incident. It was not until well after the suit had been filed that Cannon provided the
affidavits from her parents and sister confirming that Cannon had complained to them
immediately following the incident. At this point, although causation was still debatable,
Travelers paid its medical payment limits to Cannon in order to resolve her claim.
The foregoing circumstances create fairly debatable issues surrounding Cannon's
claim for necessary medical expenses and Travelers was entitled to debate the claim.
Pursuant to the law in Callioux. if a debatable reason for denial of the claim existed, the
denial is legitimized and the bad faith claim is eliminated. There can be no bad faith on the
part of Travelers under the circumstances of this matter. The trial court's granting of
summary judgment to Travelers dismissing Cannon's claim for bad faith should be affirmed
on this ground even if it is determined that Cannon had contractual privity with Travelers and
was entitled to assert a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.

VIII. A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INSURER "BAD FAITH" WITHOUT DIRECT
CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY HAS NOT BEEN RECOGNIZED IN UTAH. IF SUCH
A CAUSE OF ACTION IS N O W EXTENDED TO CLAIMANTS W H O ARE NOT
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT AND DO NOT HAVE CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY,
TRAVELERS SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO HAVE BREACHED A DUTY THAT
HAS NOT HERETOFORE BEEN RECOGNIZED UNDER UTAH LAW.
It has been established law in Utah that a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing can arise in only two circumstances. The first is where an insurer
breaches its fiduciary duty to its own insured where the insured has been sued by an injured
third party, as recognized in Ammerman. The second is where an insurer breaches its duty
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of good faith and fair dealing to its own insured with regard to a first party claim by the
insured as recognized in Beck. Both circumstances require a direct contractual relationship
between the insured and the insurer. The duty exists only between parties to the contract and
arises only out of the contractual relationship. Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly
analyzed claims for insurer bad faith against the Ammerman and Beck cases and where
neither case supports the claim, the claim has failed. See Broadwater, at 535; Pixton, at 749;
and Savage, at 866.
The Utah courts have not extended the duty of good faith and fair dealing to thirdparty beneficiaries or to so called "unnamed" insureds. If a cause of action for insurer "bad
faith" is now recognized to extend to someone in Cannon's position, it is a duty that has not
previously been recognized in Utah. If the duty is so extended, Travelers should not be held
to have breached any such duty since it has not heretofore been recognized under Utah law.
IX. TRAVELERS PAID THE LIMITS OF THE MEDICAL PAYMENTS
COVERAGE TO CANNON, AND FURTHER PAID CANNON'S CLAIM FOR
COSTS. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND INTEREST IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CLAIM TO RECOVER MEDICAL BENEFITS. NO FURTHER CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF THE EXPRESS CONTRACT TERMS EXISTS.
The second cause of action of the plaintiffs first amended complaint alleged
entitlement to reimbursement of medical expenses up to the $10,000 limit provided for
medical payments in the policy. Travelers paid the limit of its medical payments coverage
once it obtained further evidence from Cannon that her back surgery may have been causally
related to the greeting incident at the Anderson home.
As part of her claim, Cannon also sought consequential damages under the second
cause of action for the alleged breach of the obligation to pay medical expenses. Such
damages are not available for breach of the express terms of the contract. In Beck, the Utah
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Supreme Court concluded that a first party insurer who breaches the implied covenant by
unreasonably denying the insured benefits may be held liable for broad consequential
damages foreseeably caused by the breach. In the more recent case of Billings v. Union
Bankers Ins. Co. 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996), the court held that consequential damages are
available only for breach of the implied covenant, not for breach of the express terms of the
contract. The court stated:
Union Bankers asserts that this expanded consequential damage measure
should be available only for breach of the implied covenant, not, as the trial
court instructed the jury, for breach of the express terms of the contract. We
agree.... It would not further Beck's purpose of encouraging insurers to act
reasonably if we were to impose the broad consequential damages allowed in
Beck on every insurer who is ultimately determined by a court to have
incorrectly denied coverage, regardless of how reasonable the denial. Such an
insurer ought to incur no greater damage exposure than any other person
breaching the express terms of a contract.
Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
Following the trial court's granting of partial summary judgment, the parties settled
the remaining part of the second cause of action, which settlement included the payment of
Cannon's claim for costs, attorney's fees, and interest in connection with the claim to recover
medical benefits. The parties then stipulated to an order of dismissal with prejudice on the
remaining claim. (R.l 151 and Addendum 2 and 3.) Other consequential damages are not
available for breach of the express terms of a contract. Thus, even assuming privity of
contract between Cannon and Travelers and the right to sue on the part of Cannon, there is
no further claim under the express terms of the contract. The broad consequential damages
sought by Cannon are available, if at all, only for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
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X.
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF AN
INSURANCE BAD FAITH CLAIM TO A MEDICAL PAYMENTS CLAIMANT
WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT AND HAS NO CONTRACTUAL
PRIVITY WITH THE INSURER
The medical payments coverage under the Travelers policy is part of the liability
coverages obtained by the Andersons for their protection. It allows the insurer to pay certain
small claims for medical expenses regardless of issues of fault. This may avoid certain tort
claims that might otherwise be brought against the insureds by third parties. This medical
payments coverage, unlike the no-fault coverage and uninsured motorist coverage which
Cannon erroneously contends is similar, is not mandated by statute. It is a voluntary
coverage provided by insurers to their insureds under certain homeowners policies. The
nature of the coverage is therefore vastly different from no-fault coverage and uninsured
motorist coverage where such coverages are mandated by statute and the beneficiaries of
such coverages are defined as insureds in the applicable statutes and in the contracts of
insurance.
The medical payments provision of the Travelers policy provides for the payment of
certain medical expenses that are incurred because of an accident causing bodily injury to
others, i.e., third parties. Such other persons could be relatives who are not residents of the
household, such as Cannon. They can also be complete strangers, such as solicitors,
newspaper or mail carriers, or even an unknown jogger who claimed to have tripped on the
sidewalk adjoining the insured location. The extension of a cause of action for bad faith, as
advocated by Cannon to such a broad and unknown class of third parties is unwarranted and
against public policy. Public policy should encourage the writing of this type of coverage
for the benefit of the insureds who obtained the policy of insurance. If an insurer is subject
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to bad faith claims by such a broad array of third parties, who are strangers to the policy, it
will likely have an undesirable chilling effect upon the writing of such medical payments
coverage. This coverage is not a required component of homeowners insurance policies and
insurers would simply be better off not to write the coverage than be exposed to a potential
endless variety of bad faith insurance claims. Indeed, insurers would be placed in a position
such that they could be faced with a bad faith insurance claim anytime they debate payment
under the medical payments provision. The potential plaintiffs to such claims would be
endless. Such claims are not in the interest of the public of the state of Utah.
Travelers submits that there is no reason to stray from the Utah appellate cases which
have held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists only between parties to the
contract, i.e., those who are in privity of contract. Cannon was not a party to the insurance
policy with Travelers and the Andersons. She paid no premium for the policy, and indeed
had no expectation of having any coverage for medical payments regardless of fault on the
part of the insureds, the Andersons. Her benefits should be limited to the payment of medical
expenses. There is no indication by the contracting parties to make such a claimant a party
to the contract and to all implied covenants. There is no sound reason to extend a bad faith
insurance claim to such third parties, and public policy would dictate against such an
extension of the law.
CONCLUSION
Cannon is not a party to the insurance contract and is therefore not entitled to allege
an insurance bad faith claim. The district court did not commit error in granting summary
judgment and dismissing Cannon's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The district court's decision should be affirmed on any proper ground.
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Even if Cannon is deemed to be a first-party insured under the contract, intended third-party
beneficiary, or otherwise deemed entitled to bring suit against Travelers, her claim should
be limited to the benefit intended by the parties to the contract. The implied covenant should
be reserved for only those who are parties to the contract. Further, even if Cannon is entitled
to assert an insurance bad faith claim, Cannon's claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law
and any bad faith claim should therefore be dismissed. Travelers seeks affirmance of the
district court's order granting summary judgment.
DATED this / f ^ d a y of

A*n

I

, 1999.

PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

T^KRY M. PLANT
JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE
Attorneys for Appellee
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f h D DISTRICT COURT
Th/rd Judicial District
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SALT LA

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CARLA CANNON,

]
ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 940906295PI
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY,

i

Judge William A. Thome

Defendant.
The motion

for summary

judgment

filed by Defendant, The

Travelers Indemnity Company, came on for hearing before the Court
pursuant to notice on Monday, November 10, 1997, at 10:00 a.m.,
with the Honorable William A. Thorne presiding.

Defendant The

Travelers Indemnity Company was represented by its counsel, John N.
Braithwaite, and Plaintiff Carla Cannon was represented by her
counsel, L. Rich Humpherys and Nathan D. Alder.

The Court, having

considered the motion for summary judgment, having reviewed the
memoranda

and

exhibits

filed

in

support

of

the

motion,

the

memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed in opposition to the
motion, having heard arguments of counsel, being fully advised as
to the matters at issue, and finding good cause therefor,

1

HEREBY ORDERS:
1.

That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the

First Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is
granted and said cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits.

The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on

the First Cause of Action on the ground that the Plaintiff lacks
contractual privity with the Defendant and is not defined as an
insured in the policy, and that the Plaintiff cannot maintain the
action without being a party to the insurance contract or being
defined as an insured under the policy.

The Court finds that a

right to sue for medical benefits, without contractual privity,
does not give rise to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
that exists between parties to the contract.

The Court finds that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the
First Cause of Action with prejudice and on the merits.
2.

That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the

Second Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
is denied to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees
and

litigation

reimbursement

expenses
of

medical

incurred
expenses

in
up

pursuing
to

the

her
point

claim

for

when

the

$10,000.00 policy limit for medical expenses was paid, and further
seeks interest on the medical expenses up to the point when they
were paid.

The motion for summary judgment is granted on the

remaining part of the Second Cause of Action, which seeks other
consequential damages, and the same is dismissed with prejudice and
2

on the merits, there being no genuine issue as to any material
fact. The broad consequential damages sought are not available for
breach of express terms of the contract.
3.

That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the

Third Cause of Action of the Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is
granted and said cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits.

The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on

the Third Cause of Action on the ground that the Plaintiff lacks
privity of contract with the Defendant and that an action for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be
brought only by a party to the insurance contract. The Court finds
that the Plaintiff was not a party to the insurance contract, and
further is not defined as an insured in the policy.

The Court

finds that the right to sue for medical expenses under the policy
does not give rise to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
that exists between parties to the contract.

The court finds that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the
Third Cause of Action and all claims of the Plaintiff for alleged
breach

of

the

covenant

of

good

faith

and

fair dealing

with

prejudice and on the merits.
4.

That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the

Fourth Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
is granted and said cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits. The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on
3

the Fourth Cause of Action on the ground that alleged violations of
the Utah Unfair Claim Settlement Practices statutes and rules do
not give rise to any private cause of action. The Court finds that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the
Fourth Cause of Action with prejudice and on the merits.
Dated this /O

^day of

^fc^-~

, 1997
BY THE COURT:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CARLA CANNON,
Plaintiff,

(
)
]1

STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

v.
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY,

)

Civil No. 940906295PI

)

Judge William A. Thorne

Defendant.

Plaintiff Carla Cannon, through her counsel, L. Rich
Humpherys, and Defendant The Travelers Indemnity Company, through
its counsel, John N. Braithwaite, hereby stipulate and agree that
the parties have settled the remaining portion of the Second
Cause of Action of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and that
the remaining portion of the Second Cause of Action should
accordingly be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
The settlement of said claim included the payment of
Plaintiff's claim for costs and attorney's fees in connection
with the claim to recover the medical benefits under the policy,

and no further costs or attorney's fees should be awarded in
connection with this dismissal.

This stipulation for dismissal

is intended to apply only to Plaintiff's claims for attorney's
fees, costs, expenses and interest arising from the Plaintiff's
claim for recovery of medical expenses as set forth in the Second
Cause of Action of the First Amended Complaint, and does not
affect Plaintiff's right to appeal the dismissal of Plaintiff's
claims previously dismissed by this Court on December 10, 1997.
The parties jointly move the Court for an order dismissing
the remaining Second Cause of Action with prejudice and upon the
merits in accordance with this stipulation.
Dated this

%.J^

day of

Ayr<S

, 1998.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Attorneys for Plaintii/f,
Carla Cannon

Dated this

/ 7 ^ d a y of

Apri

I

, 1998.

HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C.

q$m N. BRAITHWAITE
Attorney for Defendant,
The Travelers Indemnity Company
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Terry M. Plant, Bar No. 2610
John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS

CARLA CANNON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 940906295PI

THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY,

Judge William A. Thorne

Defendant,
Based upon the stipulation and motion of the parties, and
finding good cause therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
remaining portion of Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action contained
in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice and on the merits, the parties having resolved the
claim by agreement.

No costs or attorney's fees are awarded to

either party in connection with dismissal of the Second Cause of
Action.

This dismissal shall apply only to Plaintiff's claims

for attorney's fees, costs, expenses and interest arising from
the Plaintiff's claim for medical benefits as set forth in the

Second Cause of Action of the First Amended Complaint, and does
not affect Plaintiff's right to appeal the dismissal of
Plaintiff's claims previously dismissed by this Court on December
10, 1997.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there is no further claim
remaining in this matter for adjudication by this Court, and this
order, together with the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment,
dated December 10, 1997, is the final order of this Court in this
action.
DATED this 3<Q ~~ day of

>^^^/
BY THE COURT: _

1998.

Tab 4

ThelravelersJ
•ECLARATIONS
CERTIFIED COPY
AMED
INSURED
*ND
AILING
ADDRESS

INSURER:

THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY
HOMEOWNERS POLICY
DWELLING FORM
AGENT
004989
ALDON SCOTT & JESSELIE BARLOW ANDERSON
1326 3RD AVE
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84103

HE POLICY PERIOD IS 12 MONTHS FROM

DECEMBER 03, 1991 TO DECEMBER 03, 1992

THE RESIDENCE PREMISES IS LOCATED AT:
COVERAGES

1326 3RD AVE

$
SEE
$
SEE
$
$
SEE

391,500
POLICY
274,050
POLICY
500,000
10,000
POLICY

SALT LAKE CITY

UT 84103

PREMIUMS

LIMITS OF
LIABILITY

-DWELLING
~-OTHER STRUCTURES
C-PERSONAL PROPERTY
-LOSS OF USE
-PERSONAL LIABILITY
F-MEDICAL PAYMENTS
"-REPLACEMENT COST
PROTECTION

ISSUED 02/03/95
PAGE 1 OF 1
LOCATION 1 OF 1
/ POLICY NUMBER
914969145 630 1

$ 896
INCLUDED
INCLUDED
INCLUDED
$
5
INCLUDED
$
4

TOTAL POLICY PREMIUM
$905
PROTECTIVE DEVICE
CREDIT APPLIED

SYMBOL NUMBERS (AND PREMIUMS) OF ENDORSEMENTS FORMING A PART OF THIS POLICY:
2390
7710
3100
DEDUCTIBLE FOR LOSS CAUSED BY:

'IRST MORTGAGEE:

WIND OR HAIL
$500
THEFT ' $500
ALL OTHER PERILS INSURED AGAINST $500

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS BANKITS SUCCESSORS &/OR ASSIGNS
505 EAST 200 SOUTH, POB 11428
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84147

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THIS POLICY IS A FULL, TRUE AND COMPLETE COPY OF
THE ORIGINAL POLICY AS ISSUED BY THIS COMPANY. NO INSURANCE IS AFFORDED
HEREUNDER."

AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

*GENT:

BARLWO INS INC-LAYTON

THESE DECLARATIONS AND ANY ATTACHED ENDORSEMENTS FORM A PART OF YOUR
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE POLICY, BROAD FORM 630, EDITION C4. PLEASE KEEP
'HEM WITH YOUR POLICY FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.
EXHIBIT
PL-7279 5-82

t\()L^/

TRAVELERS

S€L€CT

H O M E O W N E R S POLICY
A-Policy From One of YourTravelers Companies

TheRavelersj

Dwelling Form 630-

YOUR HOMEOWNERS POLICY QUICK REFERENCE
DECLARATIONS PAGE
Your Name
Location of Your Residence
Policy Period
Coverages
Amounts of Insurance
Deductible Amounts

AGREEMENT
DEFINITIONS
SECTION J
YOUR
PROPERTY

SECTION II
YOUR
LIABILITY

SECTION I
and
SECTION II

Beginning
On Page
. . . 1
. . . 1

COVERAGES
Coverage A—Dwelling . . .
Coverage B—Other Structures
Coverage C—Personal Property
Coverage D—Loss of Use
Additional Coverages
Loss Deductible . . .
PERILS INSURED AGAINST
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS .
CONDITIONS
Your Duties After Loss
Loss Settlement . . .

4
4
4
5
7
8
14
14
17

19
19
21

COVERAGES
26
Coverage E—Personal Liability . 26
Coverage F—Medical Payments
toOthers
26
EXCLUSIONS
27
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES . . . 32
CONDITIONS
34
Limit of Liability
34
Duties After Loss
35
CONDITIONS
Policy Period
Cancellation
Non-Renewal

36
36
37
38

OPTIONAL
ADDITIONAL
COVERAGES

39

OPTIONAL
SUPPLEMENTAL
COVERAGES

45

(Continued on next page)
Edition C4 of Policy Form 630

POLICY QUICK REFERENCE (Con't)

HOMEOWNERS POLICY

INSURING AGREEMENT . . . . 45
PERSONAL
ARTICLES
CLASSES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 45
SUPPLEMENT
NEWLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY . . 47
PERILS INSURED AGAINST .

. 47

LOSS DEDUCTIBLE

. 47

.

.

.

GENERAL EXCLUSIONS

.

.

. 48

TERRITORIAL LIMITS .

.

.

. 49

SPECIAL CONDITIONS

.

.

. 49

GENERAL CONDITIONS

.

.

. 49

PART I DEFINITIONS . . .
PERSONAL
. 52
LIABILITY
PART II INSURING AGREEMENT . 55
UMBRELLA
SUPPLEMENT PART III DEFENSE AND ADDITIONAL
COVERAGES
55

The Travelers Insurance Companies
Hartford, Connecticut
(Each a Stock Insurance Company)
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amounts of insurance (limits of liability) you
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. 58
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.
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DEFINITIONS
In this policy, "you" a n c i "your" refer to the
NAMED INSURED shown in the Declarations and
the spouse if a resident of the same household.
"We", "us" and "our" refer to the member company of The Travelers providing this insurance
and shown as the INSURER in the Declarations.
In addition, certain other words and phrases,
when printed in quotation marks, have specific
meanings when used in this policy. These are defined as follows:
1. "bodily injury" means bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care,
loss of services and death that results.
"Bodily injury" also includes "personal injury'*.
2. "business" includes trade, profession or
occupation.
3. "clerical office employee" means an employee whose duties are clerical and
wholly confined to an office. It does not
mean any "insured" who owns or financially controls a "business" or who is a
partner or member of a partnership that
owns or financially controls a "business".
4. "insured" means you and residents of
your household who are:
1

a. your relatives; or
b. other persons under the age of 21 and in
the care of any person named above.
Under Section II, "insured" also means:
c. with respect to animals or watercraft to
which this policy applies, any person or
organization legally responsible for
these animals or watercraft which are
owned by you or any person included in
4.a. or 4.b. above. A person or organization using or having custody of these
animals or watercraft in the course of
any "business" or without consent of
the owner is not an "insured";
d. with respect to any vehicle to which
this policy applies:
(1) persons while engaged in your employ or that of any person included
in 4.a. or 4.b. above; or
(2) other persons using the vehicle on
an "insured location" with your
consent.
Under Sections I and II, "insured" also includes:
e. any ADDITIONAL INSURED named in
the Declarations but only with respect
to Coverages A, B, E and F and only for
the "residence premises".
5. "insured location" means:
a. the "residence premises";
b. the part of other premises, other structures and grounds used by you as a residence and:
(1) which is shown in the Declarations
as an ADDITIONAL RESIDENCE; or
(2) which is acquired by you during the
policy period for your use as a residence;
c. any premises used by you in connection
with a premises in 5.a. or 5.b. above;
d. any part of a premises:
(1) not owned by an "insured"; and
(2) where an "insured" is temporarily
residing,2

6.

7.

8.

9.

e. vacant land, other than farm land,
owned by or rented to an "insured";
f. land owned by or rented to an "insured"
on which a one or two family dwelling is
being built as a residence for an "insured";
g. individual or family cemetery plots or
burial vaults of an "insured";
h. any part of a premises occasionally
rented to an "insured" for other than
"business" use; or
i. any premises owned by you and rented
to others for use as a residence by not
more than two families if shown in the
Declarations as a ONE OR TWO FAMILY
DWELLING RENTED TO OTHERS.
"occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful
conditions, which results, during the policy
period, in:
a. "bodily injury"; or
b. "property damage".
"personal injury" means injury arising
out of one or more of the following offenses:
a. false arrest, detention or imprisonment,
or malicious prosecution;
b. libel, slander or defamation of character; or
c. invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction
or wrongful entry.
"property damage" means physical injury
to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible
property.
"residence employee" means:
a. an employee of an "insured" whose duties are related to the maintenance or
use of the "residence premises", including household or domestic services; or
b. one who performs similar duties elsewhere not related to the "business" of
an "insured".
3

10. "residence premises" medns:
a. the one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds; or
b. that part of any other building;
where you reside and which is shown as
the "residence premises" in the Declarations.
"Residence premises" also means a two
family dwelling where you reside in at
least one of the family units and which is
shown as the RESIDENCE PREMISES in
the Declarations.

SECTION I—PROPERTY COVERAGES
COVERAGE A—DWELLING
We cover:
1. the dwelling on the "residence premises"
shown in the Declarations, including structures attached to the dwelling; and
2. materials and supplies located on or next
to the "residence premises" used to construct, alter or repair the dwelling or other
structures on the "residence premises".
This coverage does not apply to land, including
land on which the dwelling is located, except as
provided under Additional Coverage 11. Land.
COVERAGE B—OTHER STRUCTURES
We cover other structures on the "residence
premises" set apart from the dwelling by clear
space. This includes structures connected to the
dwelling by only a fence, utility line, or similar
connection.
This coverage does not apply to land, including
land on which the other structures are located,
except as provided under Additional Coverage
11. Land.
We do not cover other structures:
1. used in whole or in part for "business".
This does not include the incidental and
temporary storage of "business" property;
2. rented or held for rental to any person not
a tenant of the dwelling, unless used solely
as a private residence or private garage.
4

The limit of liability for this coverage will not be
more than 10% of the limit of liability that applies to Coverage A, unless an amount is shown
in the Declarations for Coverage B. Use of this
coverage does not reduce the Coverage A limit of
liability.
COVERAGE C—PERSONAL PROPERTY
We cover personal property owned or used by an
"insured" while it is anywhere in the world. At
your request, we will cover personal property
owned by:
1. others while the property is on the part of
the "residence premises" occupied by an
"insured";
2. a guest or a "residence employee", while
the property is in any residence occupied
by an "insured".
Our limit of liability for personal property usually located at an "insured's" residence, other
than the "residence premises", is 10% of the limit
of liability for Coverage C, or $1,000, whichever
is greater. Personal property in a newly acquired
principal residence is not subject to this limitation.
Special Limits of Liability- These limits do not increase the Coverage C limit of liability. The special limit for each numbered category below is
the total limit for each loss for all property in
that category.
1. $1,000 on money, bank notes, bullion, gold
other than goldware, silver other than
silverware, platinum, coins and medals.
2. $5,000 on securities, accounts, deeds, evidences of debt, letters of credit, notes
other than bank notes, manuscripts, personal records, passports, tickets and
stamps. This dollar limit applies to these
categories regardless of the medium (such
as paper or computer software) on which
the material exists.
However, when this property is located in
an off premises commercial or bank vault
or safety deposit box this special limit of
liability does not apply.
5

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

This limit includes the cost t o research, replace or restore the information from the
lost or damaged material.
$2,500 on watercraft, including their trailers, furnishings, equipment and outboard
motors.
$3,000 on trailers not used with watercraft.
$5,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or losing of jewelry, watches, furs, precious and
semi-precious stones.
$6,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or losing of firearms.
$10,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or losing of silverware, silver-plated ware,
goldware,
gold-plated
ware
and
pewterware. This includes flatware, hollowware, tea sets, trays and trophies made
of or including silver, gold or pewter.
$10,000 on property, on the "residence
premises", used at any time or in any manner for any "business" purpose.
$1,000 on property, away from the "residence premises", used at any time or in
any manner for any "business" purpose.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

We do cover vehicles or conveyances not
subject to motor vehicle registration which
are:
a. used to service an "insured's" residence; or
b. designed for assisting the handicapped;
aircraft and parts. Aircraft means any contrivance used or designed for flight, except
model or hobby aircraft not used or designed to carry people or cargo;
property of roomers, boarders and other
tenants, except property of roomers and
boarders related to an "insured";
property in an apartment regularly rented
or held for rental to others by an "insured";
property rented or held for rental to others
off the "residence premises";
"business" data, including such data
stored in:
o.. books of account, drawings or other paper records; or
b. electronic data processing tapes, wires,
records, discs or other software media.
However, we do cover the cost of blank recording or storage media, and of pre-recorded computer programs available on
the retail market.
credit cards or fund transfer cards except
as provided in Additional Coverage 6.
We do not cover food in a refrigerator or
freezer except as provided in Additional
Coverage 13.

Property Not Covered. We do not cover:
1. articles separately described and specifically insured in this or other insurance except as provided in Coverage Y, if applicable;
2. animals, birds or fish;
3. motor vehicles or all other motorized land
conveyances. This includes the following
while in or upon the vehicle or conveyance:
a. equipment and accessories; or
b. radio receivers, transmitters, transceivers, telephones, tape decks, or other
similar electronic equipment, if designed to operate from the electrical
system of the vehicle or conveyance.
This includes accessories, antennas,
tapes, wires or discs for use with such
equipment.

COVERAGE D—LOSS OF USE
1. If a loss covered under Section I makes
that part of the "residence premises"
where you reside not fit to live in, we
cover, at your choice, either of the following. However, if the "residence premises"
is not your principal place of residence, we
will not provide the option under paragraph b. below.
a. Additional Living Expense, meaning
any necessary increase in living ex-

6

7

9.
10.

penses incurred 4 by you so that your
household can maintain its normal standard of living; or
b. Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair
rental value of that part of the "residence premises" where you reside less
any expenses that do not continue while
the premises is not fit to live in.
Payment under a. or b. will be for the
shortest time required to repair or replace
the damage or, if you permanently relocate, the shortest time required for your
household to settle elsewhere.
2. If a loss covered under Section I makes
that part of the "residence premises"
rented to others or held for rental by you
not fit to live in, we cover the:
Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair
rental value of that part of the "residence premises" rented to others or held
for rental by you less any expenses that
do not continue while the premises is
not fit to live in.
Payment will be for the shortest time required to repair or replace that part of the
premises rented or held for rental.
3. If a civil authority prohibits you from use
of the "residence premises" as a result of
direct damage to neighboring premises by
a Peril Insured Against in this policy, fre
cover the Additional Living Expense or
Fair Rental Value loss provided under 1
and 2 above for no more than 30 days.
The periods of time under 1, 2 and 3 above are
not limited by expiration of this policy.
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation of a lease or agreement.
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

building or property contained in a building.
We will also pay your reasonable expense
for the removal from the "residence premises" of:
a. your tree felled by the peril of Windstorm
or Hail;
b. your tree felled by the peril of Weight of
Ice, Snow or Sleet; or
c. a neighbor's tree felled by a Peril Insured
Against under Coverage C,
provided the tree damages a covered structure.
2. Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reasonable cost incurred by you for necessary repairs made solely to protect covered property from further damage if a Peril Insured
Against causes the loss. This coverage does
not increase the limit of liability that applies
to the property being repaired.
3. Trees, Shrubs and Other Plants. We cover
trees, shrubs, plants or lawns on the "residence premises", for loss caused by the following Perils Insured Against: Fire or lightning, Explosion, Riot or civil commotion,
Aircraft, Vehicles not owned or operated by
a resident of the "residence premises", Vandalism or malicious mischief or Theft.
The limit of liability for this coverage will
not be more than 5% of the limit of liability
that applies to the dwelling or more than
$1,000 for any one tree, shrub or plant. We
do not cover property grown for "business"
purposes.
This coverage is additional insurance.

1. Debris Removal. We will pay your reasonable
expense for the removal of:
a. debris of covered property if a Peril Insured Against that applies to the damaged property causes the loss; or
b. ash, dust or particles from a volcanic
eruption that has caused direct loss to a

4. Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay
up to $1,000 for your liability assumed by
contract or agreement for fire department
charges incurred when the fire department is
called to save or protect covered property
from a Peril Insured Against.
This coverage is additional insurance. No deductible applies to this coverage.
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5. Property Removed. Wfc insure covered property against direct loss from any cause while
being removed from a premises endangered
by a Peril Insured Against and for no more
than 90 days while removed. This coverage
does not change the limit of liability that applies to the property being removed.
6. Credit Cards, Fund Transfer Cards, Forgery
and Counterfeit Money.

a. We will pay for loss to an "insured":
(1) resulting from theft or unauthorized
use of credit cards issued to or registered in an "insured's" name;
(2) resulting from theft or unauthorized
use of fund transfer cards used for
deposit, withdrawal or transfer of
funds, issued to or registered to an
"insured's" name;
(3) resulting from forgery or alteration
of any check or negotiable instrument; and
(4) resulting from acceptance in good
faith of counterfeit United States or
Canadian paper currency.
b. The most we will pay is $10,000 for all
loss made possible by one event, regardless of the number of cards, checks, bills,
instruments or transactions involved. Under this coverage, "event" means:
(1) a single theft or loss of any number of
credit cards, fund transfer cards,
checks or negotiable instruments;
(2) the acceptance of all counterfeit
money from any one person; and
(3) the acquisition of an "insured's" account number or identification code
by another person.
c. We do not cover use of credit cards or
fund transfer cards:
(1) by a resident of your household;
(2) by a person who has been entrusted
with either type of card; or
(3) if an "insured" has not complied with
all terms and conditions under which
the cards are issued.
10

d. We do not cover loss arising out of "business" use or dishonesty of an "insured".
e. This coverage is additional insurance. No
deductible applies to this coverage.
f. We will defend any lawsuit brought
against an "insured" for the losses described in 6.a.(l), 6.a.(2) and 6.a.(3)
above. We may investigate or settle any
claim or lawsuit. Our obligation to pay or
defend ends when the applicable limit of
liability is used up by the payment of
judgments or settlements.
7. Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $10,000
for your share of any loss assessment
charged during the policy period against you
by a corporation or association of property
owners. This only applies when the assessment is made as a result of each direct loss
to the property, owned by all members collectively, caused by a Peril Insured Against
under Coverage A—Dwelling. We do not
cover earthquake or land shock waves or
tremors before, during or after a volcanic
eruption unless Coverage O—Earthquake
applies.
This coverage applies only to loss assessments charged against you as owner or tenant of the "residence premises".
We do not cover loss assessments charged
against you or a corporation or association
of property owners by any governmental
body.
8. Landlord's Furnishings. We cover your property in an apartment on the "residence
premises" which you rent or hold for rental
to others. Coverage is limited to household
furnishings. We insure for direct physical
loss to this property caused by a Peril Insured Against under Coverage C, except
theft.
Our limit of liability for this coverage is
$10,000.
9. Inflation Coverage. The limit of liability
shown in the Declarations for Coverage A—
Dwelling, will be adjusted at the time of loss
11

to reflect any increase in the cost of construction as reported to us by a recognized
appraisal company. Corresponding adjustments will also be made in the limits of liability for Coverages B, C and D. In no event
will these adjustments result in limits less
than those shown in the Declarations for
these coverages.
The amount of increase will be calculated
from the effective date of the policy period
shown in the Declarations to the date of the
loss. If the limit of liability for Coverage A is
changed at your request during the policy
period, we will use the effective date of
change in place of the effective date of the
policy to calculate the increase.
10. Building Additions and Alterations. We cover
additions, alterations and improvements,
made or acquired at the "insured's" expense, to that part of a building which is
rented to the "insured" as a residence. We
insure for direct physical loss to this property caused by a Peril Insured Against. Our
limit of liability for this coverage is $1,000.
11. Land. Whenever there is a covered loss to
your dwelling or other permanent structure
and the related repair or rebuilding requires
excavation, replacement, or stabilization of
land under or around your dwelling or other
permanent structure, we will also pay up to
10% of the amount of the covered loss to
your dwelling or other permanent structure
for the excavation, replacement, or stabilization of the land.
12. Collapse. We insure for direct physical loss
to covered property involving collapse of a
building or any part of a building caused
only by one or more of the following:
a. Perils Insured Against in Coverage A and
B;
b. hidden decay;
c. hidden insect or vermin damage;
d. weight of contents, equipment, animals or
people;
e. weight of rain which collects on a roof; or
12

f. use of defective material or methods in
construction, remodeling or renovation if
the collapse occurs during the course of
the construction, remodeling or renovation.
Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement,
swimming pool, underground pipe, flue,
drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf or dock is
not included under items b., c , d., e. and f.
unless the loss is a direct result of the collapse of a building.
Collapse does not include settling, cracking,
shrinking, bulging or expansion.
This coverage does not increase the limit of
liability applying to the damaged covered
property.
This additional coverage does not apply to
Coverage C—Personal Property.
13. Refrigerated Food Spoilage. We cover food
in a refrigerator or freezer on the "residence
premises" for direct physical loss caused by
a change in temperature due to:
a. Interruption of electrical power to the refrigeration equipment; or
b. mechanical breakdown or electrical failure of the refrigeration unit.
The most we will pay is $1,000. We will pay
only the part of the loss that exceeds $50.
Any other loss to refrigerated food caused
by a Peril Insured Against is covered up to
the limit of Coverage C of the policy. The
policy deductible will apply.
14. Lock Replacement. We will pay up to $500
for the reasonable costs incurred by you to
replace the locks at the "residence premises" when your keys to the "residence
premises" have been lost or stolen. No deductible applies to this coverage.
15. Reward Coverage. We will pay up to $1,000
for the payment of rewards you have incurred for information leading to the return
of stolen articles or the arrest and conviction
of any person(s) who have stolen articles or
damaged any of your covered property.
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16. Data Replacement We will pay up to $5,000
to recreate personal records or data stored
on a tape, record, disc or other media designed for use with a computer on the "residence premises''.
LOSS DEDUCTIBLE

In case of a loss covered under Section I, we will
pay only the part of the loss over the applicable
deductible amount stated in the Declarations.
However, if the amount of the covered loss is
equal to or greater than $50,000 we will waive
the first $500 of any deductible.
SECTION I—PERILS INSURED AGAINST

We insure the property described in Coverages A,
B and C against risks of direct physical loss, subject to the following Exclusions, the Section I—
General Exclusions, and other provisions of this
policy.
1. Coverage A, Coverage B and Coverage C
Exclusions

We do not cover loss caused by:
a. freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protective
sprinkler system or of a household appliance, or by discharge, leakage or overflow from within the system or appliance
caused by freezing. This exclusion applies only while the dwelling is vacant,
unoccupied or being constructed, unless
you have used reasonable care to:
(1) maintain heat in the building; or
(2) shut off the water supply and drain
the system and appliances of water;
b. freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of
water or ice, whether driven by wind or
not, to a:
(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming
pool;
(2) foundation, retaining wail or bulkhead; or
(3) pier, wharf or dock;
c. theft in or to a dwelling under construction, or of materials and supplies for use
14

m the construction until the dwelling is
finished and occupied;
d. (1) wear and tear, marring, deterioration;
(2) inherent vice, latent defect, mechanical breakdown;
(3) smog, rust, mold, wet or dry rot;
(4) smoke from agricultural smudging or
industrial operations;
(5) release, discharge or dispersal of
contaminants or pollutants;
(6) settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging
or expansion of pavements, patios,
foundations, walls, floors, roofs or
ceilings; or
(7) birds, vermin, rodents, insects or domestic animals.
If any of these cause water damage not otherwise excluded, from a plumbing, heating,
air conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or household appliance, we cover loss caused by the water including the cost of tearing out and replacing any part of a building or grounds
necessary to repair the system or appliance.
We do not cover loss to the system or appliance from which this water escaped.
Under items a. through d., any ensuing loss to
property described in Coverages A, B and C
not excluded or excepted in this policy is covered.
2. Coverage A and Coverage B Exclusions
We do not cover loss:

a. caused by vandalism and malicious mischief or breakage of glass and safety
glazing materials if the dwelling has been
vacant for more than 30 consecutive days
immediately before the loss. A dwelling
being constructed is not considered vacant.
b. involving collapse, other than as provided in Additional Coverage 12. However, any ensuing loss to property described in Coverages A and B not ex15

eluded or excepted in this policy is
covered.
3. Coverage C Exclusions
We do not cover loss caused by:
a. breakage of:
(1) eyeglasses, glassware, statuary, marble;
(2) bric-a-brac, porcelains and similar
fragile articles other than jewelry,
watches, bronzes, cameras and photographic lenses.
There is coverage for breakage of the
property by or resulting from:
(1) fire, lightning, windstorm, hail;
(2) smoke, other than smoke from agricultural smudging or industrial operations;
(3) explosion, riot, civil commotion;
(4) aircraft, vehicles, vandalism and malicious mischief, earthquake, or volcanic eruption;
(5) collapse of a building or any part of a
building;
(6) water not otherwise excluded;
(7) theft or attempted theft; or
(8) sudden and accidental tearing apart,
cracking, burning or bulging of:
(a) a steam or hot water heating system;
(b) an air conditioning or automatic
fire protective sprinkler system;
or
(c) an appliance for heating water;
b. dampness of atmosphere or extremes of
temperature unless the direct cause of
loss is rain, snow, sleet or hail;
c. refinishing, renovating or repairing property other than watches, jewelry and
furs;
d. collision, other than collision with a land
vehicle, sinking, swamping or stranding
of watercraft, including their trailers,
furnishings, equipment and outboard motors;
16

e destruction, contiscation or seizure by order of any government or public authority; or
f. acts or decisions, including the failure to
act or decide, of any person, group, organization or governmental body. However,
any ensuing loss to property described in
Coverage C not excluded or excepted in
this policy is covered.
SECTION I—GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
1 These additional exclusions apply to Coverages A, B and C. We do not insure for loss
caused directly or indirectly by any of the
following, regardless of any other cause or
event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss:
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of
any ordinance or law regulating the construction, repair, or demolition of a building or other structure, except as provided
under Loss Settlement in Section I—Conditions.
b. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake including land shock waves or tremors
before, during or after a volcanic eruption; landslide; mudflow; earth sinking,
rising or shifting; unless direct loss by:
(1) fire or explosion;
(2) theft; or
(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing
material which is part of a building,
storm door or storm window;
ensues and then we will pay only for the
ensuing loss.
This exclusion applies only to property
described in Coverages A and B.
c. Water Damage, meaning:
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal
water, overflow of a body of water, or
spray from any of these, whether or
not driven by wind;
(2) water below the surface of the
ground, including water which exerts
pressure on or seeps or leaks through
17

a building, sidewalk, driveway, tounT
dation, swimming pool or other struc*
ture.
Direct loss by fire, explosion or theft resulting from water damage is covered.
Water damage indirectly caused by fire,
vehicles, aircraft or vandalism or malicious mischief is also covered.
Paragraphs (1) and (3) of this exclusion
do not apply to any insured direct physical loss by water from any plumbing,
heating, air conditioning or automatic fire
protective sprinkler system on the "residence premises".
Water damage to property described in
Coverage C away from a premises or location owned, rented, occupied or controlled
by an "insured" is covered.
Water damage to property described in
Coverage C on a premises or location
owned, rented, occupied or controlled by
an "insured" is excluded even if weather
conditions contribute in any way to produce the loss.
d. Neglect, meaning neglect of the "insured"
to use all reasonable means to save and
preserve property at and after the time of
a loss.

2. We do not insure for loss to property described in Coverages A and B caused by any
of the following. However, any ensuing loss
to property described in Coverages A and B
not excluded or excepted in this policy is
covered.
a. Weather Conditions. However, this exclusion only applies if weather conditions
contribute in any way with a cause or
event excluded in paragraph 1. above to
produce the loss;
b. Acts or Decisions, including the failure to
act or decide, of any person, group, organization or governmental body;
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective:

(1) planning, zoning, development, surveying, siting;
(2) design, specifications, workmanship,
repair, construction, renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction;
(3) materials used in repair, construction,
renovation or remodeling; or
(4) maintenance;
of part or all of any property whether on
or off the "residence premises".
SECTION I—CONDITIONS

e. War, including undeclared war, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a military force or military personnel, destruction or seizure or use for a
military purpose, and including any consequence of any of these. Discharge of a
nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike
act even if accidental.

1. Insurable Interest and Limit of Liability. Even
if more than one person has an insurable interest in the property covered, we will not
be liable in any one loss to the "insured" for
more than the amount of the "insured's" interest at the time of loss. However, the most
we will pay is the applicable limit of liability.

f. Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth in
the Nuclear Hazard Clause of Section I—
Conditions.

2. Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to
covered property, you must see that the following are done:
a. give prompt notice to us. You may phone
our Instant Claim Service or contact your
agent;
b. notify the police in case of loss by theft;
c. notify the credit card or fund transfer
card companies in case of loss under

g. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising
out of any act committed:
(1) by or at the direction of an "insured";
and
(2) with the intent to cause a loss.
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d.

e.

f.

g.

Credit Cards or Fund Transfer Cards coverage;
(1) protect the property from further
loss;
(2) make reasonable and necessary repairs to protect the property; and
(3) keep an accurate record of repair expenses;
prepare a detailed inventory of personal
property claimed. The inventory must include a description of the property, quantity, replacement cost, amount of depreciation and amount of loss. Attach all bills,
receipts and related papers that support
your inventory;
as often as we reasonably require:
(1) show the damaged property;
(2) provide us with records and documents we request and permit us to
make copies; and
(3) submit to examination under oath;
send to us, within 60 days after our request, your signed, sworn proof of loss
which sets forth, to the best of your
knowledge and belief:
(1) the time and cause of loss;
(2) the interest of the "insured" and all
others in the property involved and
all liens on the property;
(3) other insurance which may cover the
loss;
(4) changes in title or occupancy of the
property during the term of the policy;
(5) specifications of damaged buildings
and detailed repair estimates;
(6) the inventory of personal property
described in 2.e. above;
(7) receipts for additional living expenses incurred and records that support the fair rental value loss; and
(8) evidence or affidavit that supports a
claim under the Credit Cards, Fund
Transfer Cards, Forgery and Counter20

feit' Money coverage, stating the
amount and cause of loss.
3. Loss Settlement. Covered property losses
are settled as follows:
a. (1) personal property;
(2) awnings, carpeting, household appliances, outdoor antennas and outdoor
equipment, whether or not attached
to buildings; and
(3) structures that are not buildings;
at the replacement cost at the time of
loss. For articles separately described
and specifically insured in this policy or a
Personal Articles Policy issued to you by
us, this settlement provision will be excess over the amount recoverable under
such other insurance.
We will pay no more than the least of the
following amounts:
a. replacement cost at the time of loss
without deduction for depreciation;
b. the full cost of repair at the time of
loss;
c. the limit of liability that applies to
Coverage C; or
d. any applicable special limits of liability stated in this policy.
We will not pay more than the actual cost
to repair or replace, less deduction for depreciation, at the time of loss for any of
the following:
a. antiques, fine arts, paintings and
similar articles of rarity or antiquity which cannot be replaced;
b. memorabilia, souvenirs, collector's
items and similar articles whose age
or history contribute to their value;
c. articles not maintained in good or
workable condition; or
d. articles that are outdated or obsolete and are stored or not being
used.
b. Buildings under Coverage A or Coverage
B at replacement cost without deduction
for depreciation. Replacement cost will
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include any increased cost due to the enforcement of any ordinance or law that
regulates the construction, repair or demolition of the covered buildings. Loss settlements under this paragraph are subject
to the following:
(1) we will pay the actual cost to repair
or replace, without deduction for depreciation, but not more than the
least of the following amounts:
(a) the limit of liability under this
policy that applies to the building;
(b) the replacement cost of that part
of the building damaged for like
construction and use on the same
premises; or
(c) the necessary amount actually
spent to repair or replace the
damaged building;
(2) we will pay no more than the replacement cost of the damage, less deduction for depreciation, unless:
(a) actual repair or replacement is
complete; or
(b) the cost to repair or replace the
damage is less than $5,000.
4. Loss to a Pair or Set. In case of loss to a pair
or set we may elect to:
a. repair or replace any part to restore the
pair or set to its value before the loss; or
b. pay the difference between the value of
the property before and after the loss.
5. Glass Replacement. Loss for damage to glass
caused by a Peril Insured Against will be settled on the basis of replacement with safety
glazing materials when required by ordinance or law.
6. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the
amount of loss, either may demand an appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party
will choose a competent appraiser within 20
days after receiving a written request from
the other. The two appraisers will choose an
umpire. If they cannot agree upon an umpire
within 15 days, you or we may request that
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the choice be made by a judge of a court of
record in the state where the 4t residence
premises'' is located. The appraisers will
separately set the amount of loss. If the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed upon will be
the amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they
will submit their differences to the umpire. A
decision agreed to by any two will set the
amount of loss.
Each party will:
a. pay its own appraiser; and
b. bear the other expenses of the appraisal
and umpire equally.
7. Other Insurance. If a loss covered by this
policy is also covered by other insurance, we
will pay only the proportion of the loss that
the limit of liability that applies under this
policy bears to the total amount of insurance
covering the loss.
8. Suit Against Us. Legal action may not be
brought against us under any coverage provided by this policy unless the "insured" has
fully complied with all the terms of this policy. Legal action taken against us must begin
within two years after the date of loss.
9. Our Option. If we give you written notice
within 30 days after we receive your signed,
sworn proof of loss, we may repair or replace any part of the claimed property with
like property.
10. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with
you. We will pay you unless some other person is named in the policy or is legally entitled to receive payment. Loss will be payable
30 days after we receive your proof of loss
and:
a. reach an agreement with you;
b. there is an entry of a final judgment; or
c. there is a filing of an appraisal award
with us.
11. Abandonment of Property. We need not accept any property abandoned by an "insured".
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12. Mortgage Clause.

The word "mortgagee" includes trustee.
If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any
loss payable under Coverage A or B will be
paid to the mortgagee and you, as interests
appear. If more than one mortgagee is
named, the order of payment will be the
same as the order of precedence of the mortgages.
If we deny your claim, that denial will not
apply to a valid claim of the mortgagee, if
the mortgagee:
a. notifies us of any change in ownership,
occupancy or substantial change in risk
of which the mortgagee is aware;
b. pays any premium due under this policy
on demand if you have neglected to pay
the premium; and
c. submits a signed, sworn statement of loss
within 60 days after receiving notice
from us of your failure to do so. Policy
conditions relating to Appraisal, Suit
Against Us and Loss Payment apply to
the mortgagee.
If the policy is cancelled or not renewed by
us, the mortgagee will be notified at least 10
days before the date cancellation or nonrenewal takes effect.
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and
deny payment to you:
a. we are subrogated to all the rights of the
mortgagee granted under the mortgage on
the property; or
b. at our option, we may pay to the mortgagee the whole principal on the mortgage
plus any accrued interest. In this event,
we will receive a full assignment and
transfer of the mortgage and all securities held as collateral to the mortgage
debt.
Subrogation will not impair the right of the
mortgagee to recover the full amount of the
mortgagee's claim.

benefits a person or organization holding,
storing or moving property for a fee regardless of any other provision of this policy.
14. Nuclear Hazard Clause.

a. "Nuclear Hazard" means any nuclear reaction, radiation, or radioactive contamination, all whether controlled or uncontrolled or however caused, or any consequence of any of these.
b. Loss caused by the nuclear hazard will
not be considered loss caused by fire, explosion, or smoke, whether these perils
are specifically named in or otherwise included within the Perils Insured Against
in Section I.
c. This policy does not apply under Section I
to loss caused directly or indirectly by
nuclear hazard, except that direct loss by
fire resulting from the nuclear hazard is
covered.
15. Recovered Property. If you or we recover
any property for which we have made payment under this policy, you or we will notify
the other of the recovery. At your option,
the property will be returned to or retained
by you or it will become our property. If the
recovered property is returned to or retained by you, the loss payment will be adjusted based on the amount you received for
the recovered property.
16. Volcanic Eruption Period. One or more volcanic eruptions that occur within a 72-hour
period will be considered as one volcanic
eruption.

13. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize
any assignment or grant any coverage that

17. Premises Security or Fire Protection System.
(Applies only if PROTECTIVE DEVICES
CREDIT APPLIED is shown in the Declarations.) We acknowledge the installation and
approval of a security or fire protection system on the ''residence premises". You agree
to maintain the system in working order and
to notify us promptly of any change made to
the system or if it is removed.
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SECTION 11—LIABILITY COVERAGES
COVERAGE E —PERSONAL LIABILITY
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an
"insured" for damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage'1 caused by an "occurrence" to which this coverage applies, we

d. is caused by an animal owned by or in
the care of an "insured".

COVERAGE F —MEDICAL PAYMENTS TO
OTHERS
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that
are incurred or medically ascertained withjn
three years from the date of an accident causing
"bodily injury". Medical expenses means reasonable charges for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental,
ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices and funeral services. This coverage does not apply to you or regular residents of
your household except "residence employees".
As to others, this coverage applies only:
1. to a person on the "insured location" with
the permission of an "insured"; or
2. to a person off the "insured location", if
the "bodily injury":
a. arises out of a condition on the "insured
location" or the ways immediately adjoining;
b. is caused by the activities of an "insured";
c. is caused by a "residence employee" in
the course of the "residence employee's" employment by an "insured";
or

SECTION II—EXCLUSIONS
1. Coverage E—Personal Liability and Coverage F—Medical Payments to Others do
not apply to "bodily injury" or "property
damage":
a. which is expected or intended by the "Insured";
b. arising out of "business" pursuits of an
"insured" except those of a "clerical office employee"; or the rental or holding
for rental of any part of any premises by
an "insured".
This exclusion does not apply to:
(1) activities which are usual to nonbusiness" pursuits; or
(2) the rental or holding for rental of an
"insured location":
(a) on an occasional basis if used
only as a residence;
(b) in part for use only as a residence, unless a single family unit
is intended for use by the occupying family to lodge more than two
roomers or boarders; or
(c) in part, as an office, school, studio
or private garage;
(3) the rental of other structures on the
"residence premises" for use as a private residence if the words INCLUDES STRUCTURES RENTED TO
OTHERS are shown in the Declarations;
c. arising out of the rendering of or failure
to render professional services;
d. arising out of a premises:
(1) owned by an "insured";
(2) rented to an "insured"; or
(3) rented to others by an "insured";
that is not an "insured location";
e. arising out of:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use,
loading or unloading of motor vehi-
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will:

1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the "insured" is legally liable. Damages include prejudgment interest
awarded against the "insured"; and
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit that we
decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or
defend ends when the amount we pay for
damages resulting from the "occurrence"
equals our limit of liability.

cles or all other motorized land conveyances, including trailers, owned
or operated by or rented or loaned to
an "insured 1 ';
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a
motor vehicle or any other motorized
land conveyance to any person; or
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether
imposed by statute or otherwise, for,
the actions of a child or minor using a
conveyance excluded in paragraph
(1) or (2) above.
This exclusion does not apply to:
(1) a trailer not towed by or carried on a
motorized land conveyance;
(2) a motorized land conveyance designed for recreational use off public
roads, not subject to motor vehicle
registration and:
(a) not owned by an "insured"; or
(b) owned by an "insured" and on an
"insured location";
(3) a motorized golf cart when used to
play golf on a golf course; or
(4) a vehicle or conveyance not subject to
motor vehicle registration which is:
(a) used to service an "insured's"
residence;
(b) designed for assisting the handicapped; or
(c) in dead storage on an "insured location";
f. arising out of:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use,
loading or unloading of a watercraft
described below;
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a
watercraft described below to any
person; or
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether
imposed by statute or otherwise, for
the actions of a child or minor using a
watercraft described below.
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Watercraft:
(1) with inboard or inboard-outdnve motor power owned by an "insured";
(2) with inboard or inboard-outdnve motor power of more than 50 horsepower rented to an "insured";
(3) that is a sailing vessel with or without auxiliary power, 26 feet or more
in length owned by or rented to an
"insured"; or
(4) powered by one or more outboard motors with more than 25 total horsepower if the outboard motor is owned
by an "insured". But, outboard motors of more than 25 total horsepower
are covered for the policy period if•
(a) you acquire them prior to the policy period and:
(i) you declare them at policy inception; or
(ii) your intention to insure is reported to us m writing within
45 days after you acquire the
outboard motors;
(b) you acquire them during the policy period.
This exclusion does not apply while the
watercraft is stored,
g. arising out of:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use,
loading or unloading of an aircraft;
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of
an aircraft to any person; or
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether
imposed by statute or otherwise, for
the actions of a child or minor using
an aircraft.
An aircraft means any contnvance used
or designed for flight, except model or
hobby aircraft not used or designed to
carry people or cargo;
h. caused directly or indirectly by war, including undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act
by a military force or military personnel,
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e.

destruction or seizure or use for a miii-.
tary purpose, and including any consequence of any of these. Discharge of a nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike
act even if accidental;
i. which arises out of the transmission of a
communicable disease by an "insured".
Exclusions l.d., I.e., l.f. and l.g. do not apply to t4bodily injury" to a "residence employee" arising out of and in the course of
the "residence employee's" employment by
an "insured".
2. Coverage E—Personal Liability, does not
apply to:
a. liability:
(1) for your share of any loss assessment
charged against all members of an association, corporation or community
of property owners;
(2) under any contract or agreement.
However, this exclusion does not apply to written contracts:
(a) that directly relate to the ownership, maintenance or use of an
"insured location"; or
(b) where the liability of others is assumed by an "insured" prior to
an "occurrence";
unless excluded in (1) above or elsewhere in this policy;
b. "property damage" to property owned by
an "insured";
c. "property damage" to property rented to,
occupied or used by or in the care of an
"insured". This exclusion does not apply
to "property damage" caused by fire,
smoke, explosion or water;
d. "bodily injury" to any person eligible to
receive any benefits:
(1) voluntarily provided; or
(2) required to be provided;
by an "insured" under any:
(1) workers' compensation law;
(2) non-occupational disability law; or
(3) occupational disease law;
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bodily injury" or "property damage" for
which an "insured" under this policy:
(1) is also an insured under a nuclear energy liability policy; or
(2) would be an insured under that policy
but for the exhaustion of its limits of
liability.
A nuclear energy liability policy is one issued by:
(1) American Nuclear Insurers;
(2) Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters;
(3) Nuclear Insurance Association of
Canada;
or any of their successors;
f. "bodily injury" to you or an "insured"
within the meaning of part a. or b. of "insured" as defined; or
g. "bodily injury" to any employee arising
out of or in the course of the employee's
employment by any ADDITIONAL INSURED named in the Declarations.
3- Coverage F—Medical Payments to
Others, does not apply to "bodily injury":
a. to a "residence employee" if the "bodily
injury":
(1) occurs off the "insured location"; and
(2) does not arise out of or in the course
of the "residence employee's" employment by an "insured";
b. to any person eligible to receive benefits:
(1) voluntarily provided; or
(2) required to be provided;
under any:
(1) workers' compensation law;
(2) non-occupational disability law; or
(3) occupational disease law;
c. from any:
(1) nuclear reaction;
(2) nuclear radiation; or
(3) radioactive contamination;
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all whether controlled or uncontrolled or
however caused; or
(4) any consequence of any of these; or
d. to any person, other than a "residence
employee" of an "insured", regularly re*
siding on any part of the "insured location".
Only the following exclusions apply to "personal
injury". "Personal injury" does not apply to:
1. liability assumed by the "insured" under
any contract or agreement except any indemnity obligation assumed by the "insured" under a written contract directly
relating to the ownership, maintenance or
use of the premises;
2. injury caused by a violation of a penal law
or ordinance committed by or with the
knowledge or consent of an "insured";
3. injury sustained by any person as a result
of an offense directly or indirectly related
to the employment of this person by the
"insured";
4. injury arising out of the "business" pursuits of an "insured"; or
5. civic or public activities performed for pay
by an "insured".
SECTION II—ADDITIONAL COVERAGES
We cover the following in addition to the limits of
liability:
1. Claim Expenses. We pay:
a. expenses we incur and costs taxed
against an "insured" in any suit we defend;
b. premiums on bonds required in a suit we
defend, but not for bond amounts more
than the limit of liability for Coverage E.
We need not apply for or furnish any
bond;
c. reasonable expenses incurred by an "insured" at our request, including actual
loss of earnings (but not loss of other income) up to $250 per day, for assisting us
in the investigation or defense of a claim
or suit;
32

d. interest on the entire judgment which accrues after entry of the judgment and
before we pay or tender, or deposit in
court that part of the judgment which
does not exceed the limit of liability that
applies.
2. First Aid Expenses, We will pay expenses for
first aid to others incurred by an "insured"
for "bodily injury" covered under this policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any
other "insured".
3. Damage to Property of Others. We will pay,
at replacement cost, up to $1,000 per "occurrence" for "property damage" to property
of others caused by an "insured".
We will not pay for "property damage":
a. to the extent of any amount recoverable
under Section I of this policy;
b. caused intentionally by an "insured" who
is 13 years of age or older;
c. to property owned by an "insured";
d. to property owned by or rented to a tenant of an "insured" or a resident in your
household; or
e. arising out of:
(1) "business" pursuits;
(2) any act or omission in connection
with a premises owned, rented or controlled by an "insured", other than
the "insured location"; or
(3) the ownership, maintenance, or use
of aircraft, watercraft or motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances.
This exclusion does not apply to a
motorized land conveyance designed
for recreational use off public roads,
not subject to motor vehicle registration and not owned by an "insured".
4. Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $10,000
for your share of any loss assessment
charged during the policy period against you
by a corporation or association of property
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owners, when the assessment is made as a
result of:
a. each "occurrence" to which Section II of
this policy would apply;
b. liability for each act of a director, officer
or trustee in the capacity as a director,
officer or trustee, provided:
(1) the director, officer or trustee is
elected by the members of a corporation or association of property owners; and
(2) the director, officer or trustee serves
without deriving any income from the
exercise of duties which are solely on
behalf of a corporation or association
of property owners.
This coverage applies only to loss assessments charged against you as owner or tenant of the 4tresidence premises".
We do not cover loss assessments charged
against you or a corporation or association
of property owners by any governmental
body.
Section II—Coverage E—Personal Liability
Exclusion 2.a.(l) does not apply to this coverage.
SECTION II—CONDITIONS
1. Limit of Liability. Our total liability under
Coverage E for all damages resulting from
any one "occurrence" will not be more than
the limit of liability for Coverage E as shown
in the Declarations. This limit is the same
regardless of the number of "insureds",
claims made or persons injured.
All "bodily injury" and "property damage"
resulting from any one accident or from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions
shall be considered to be the result of one
"occurrence".
Our total liability under Coverage F for all
medical expense payable for "bodily injury"
to one person as the result of one accident
will not be more than the limit of liability for
Coverage F as shown in the Declarations.
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2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance applies separately to each "insured". This condition will not increase our limit of liability
for any one "occurrence".
3. Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or
"occurrence", the "insured" will perform
the following duties that apply. You will help
us by seeing that these duties are performed:
a. give written notice to us or our agent as
soon as is practical, which sets forth:
(1) the identity of the policy and "insured";
(2) reasonably available information on
the time, place and circumstances of
the accident or "occurrence"; and
(3) names and addresses of any claimants and witnesses;
b. promptly forward to us every notice, demand, summons or other process relating
to the accident or "occurrence";
c. at our request, help us:
(1) to make settlement;
(2) to enforce any right of contribution
or indemnity against any person or
organization who may be liable to an
"insured";
(3) with the conduct of suits and attend
hearings and trials; and
(4) to secure and give evidence and obtain the attendance of witnesses;
d. under the coverage—Damage to Property
-of Others—submit to us within 60 days
after the loss, a sworn statement of loss
and show the damaged property, if in the
"insured's" control;
e. the "insured" will not, except at the "insured's" own cost, voluntarily make payment, assume obligation or incur expense
other than for first aid to others at the
time of the "bodily injury".
4. Duties of an Injured Person—Coverage F—
Medical Payments to Others. The injured
person or someone acting for the injured
person will:
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a. give us written proof of claim, under oath
if required, as soon as is practical; and
b. authorize us to obtain copies of medical
reports and records.
The injured person will submit to a physical
exam by a doctor of our choice when and as
often as we reasonably require.
5. Payment of Claim—Coverage F—Medical
Payments to Others. Payment under this
coverage is not an admission of liability by
an "insured" or us.
6. Suit Against Us. No action can be brought
against us unless there has been compliance
with the policy provisions.
No one will have the right to join us as a
party to any action against an "insured".
Also, no action with respect to Coverage E
can be brought against us until the obligation of the "insured" has been determined
by final judgment or agreement signed by us.
7. Bankruptcy of an Insured. Bankruptcy or insolvency of an "insured" will not relieve us
of our obligations under this policy.
8. Other Insurance—Coverage E—Personal Liability. This insurance is excess over other
valid and collectible insurance except insurance written specifically to cover as excess
over the limits of liability that apply in this
policy.

SECTIONS I AND II—CONDITIONS
1. POLICY PERIOD. This policy applies only to
loss in Section I or "bodily injury" or "property damage" in Section II, which occurs
during the policy period shown in the Declarations. That policy period, and each successive period, begins and ends at 12:01 a.m.
standard time, at the "residence premises".
2. PREMIUM. The premium shown in the Declarations is the premium for the policy period
shown. If we elect to continue this insurance, we will renew this policy if you pay
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the required renewal premium for the successive policy period, subject to our premiums, rules and forms then in effect. You must
pay us prior to the end of the current policy
period or else this policy will not continue.
3. CONCEALMENT OR FRAUD. The entire policy

will be void if, whether before or after a
loss, an "insured" has:
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented
any material fact or circumstance;
b. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or
c. made false statements;
relating to this insurance.
4. LIBERALIZATION CLAUSE. If we change any

part of this policy to broaden coverage without charge, your policy will be interpreted to
provide this broadened coverage. The broadened coverage will begin on the date that the
change is effective in your state.
5. WAIVER OR CHANGE OF POLICY PROVI-

SIONS. A waiver or change of a provision of
this policy must be in writing by us to be
valid. Our request for an appraisal or examination will not waive any of our rights.
6. STATE STATUTES. The terms of this policy
that are in conflict with the statutes of the
state in which this policy is issued, are
hereby amended to conform to those statutes.
7. CANCELLATION.

a. The named insured shown in the Declarations may cancel this policy at any time
by returning it to us or by letting us know
in writing of the date cancellation is to
take effect.
b. We may cancel this policy only for the
reasons stated below by letting the
named insured know in writing of the
date cancellation takes effect. This cancellation notice will be mailed to the
named insured at the mailing address last
shown in the Declarations.
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Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of
notice. Delivery of this notice will be
deemed the same as mailing. The effective
date and time of cancellation stated in the
notice will become the end of the policy
period.
(1) When the named insured has not paid
the premium, we may cancel at any
time by letting the named insured
know at least 10 days before the date
cancellation takes effect.
(2) When this policy has been in effect
for less than 60 days and is not a renewal with us, we may cancel for any
reason by letting the named insured
know at least 10 days before the date
cancellation takes effect.
(3) When this policy has been in effect
for 60 days or more, or at any time if
it is a renewal with us, we may cancel:
(a) if there has been a material misrepresentation of fact which if known
to us would have caused us not to
issue the policy; or
(b) if the risk has changed substantially
since the policy was issued.
This can be done by letting the named
insured know at least 30 days before
the date cancellation takes effect.
c. When this policy is cancelled, the premium for the period from the date of cancellation to the expiration date will be refunded pro rata.
d. If the return premium is not refunded
with the notice of cancellation or when
this policy is returned to us, we will refund it within a reasonable time after the
date cancellation takes effect.
e. If this policy is cancelled by us, any ADDITIONAL INSURED named in the Declarations will be notified in writing.
8. NON-RENEWAL

a. We may elect not to renew this policy. We
may do so by mailing to the named in38

sured at the mailing address last shown
in the Declarations, written notice at
least 45 days before the expiration date
of this policy. Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice. Delivery of this notice will be deemed the same as mailing.
b. If this policy is not renewed by us, any
ADDITIONAL INSURED named in the
Declarations will be notified m writing.
c. This policy will terminate without notice
at the end of any policy period for failure
to pay any premium when due.
9. ASSIGNMENT. Assignment of this policy will
not be valid unless we give our written consent.
10. SUBROGATION. An "insured" may waive in
writing before a loss all rights of recovery
against any person. If they are not so
waived, we may require an assignment of
rights of recovery for a loss to the extent
that payment is made by us.
If an assignment is sought, an "insured"
must sign and deliver all related papers and
cooperate with us.
Subrogation does not apply under Section II
to Medical Payments to Others or Damage to
Property of Others.
11. DEATH OF NAMED INSURED. If you die, we

will insure your legal representative but
only with respect to your premises and property covered under this policy at the time of
your death.
The definition of "insured" will also include
any person having temporary custody of
your property until the appointment of a legal representative.

OPTIONAL ADDITIONAL COVERAGES
This section of your policy contains additional
coverage options that you may select. None apply, however, unless specifically selected by you.
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The coverages you have selected are listed in the
COVERAGES section in the Declarations.
COVERAGE G —MONEY
The Special Limit of Liability No. 1 under Coverage C—Personal Property is increased. The revised limit for No. 1 is shown in the Declarations.

COVERAGE H—REPLACEMENT COST
PROTECTION
We agree to amend present coverage amounts in
accordance with the following provisions:
1. If you have:
a. allowed us to adjust the Coverage A limit of
liability and the premium in accordance
with:
(1) any property evaluations we make; and
(2) any increases in the cost of construction as reported to us by a recognized
appraisal company; and
b. notified us, within 30 days of completion,
of any alterations to the dwelling which increase the replacement cost of the dwelling
by $5,000 or more; and
c. elected to repair or replace the damaged
building;
we will:
d. increase the Coverage A limit of liability to
equal the current replacement cost of the
dwelling if the amount of loss to the dwelling is more than the limit of liability shown
in the Declarations; and
e. increase by the same percentage applied to
Coverage A, the limits of liability for Coverages B, C and D. However, we will do this
only if the Coverage A limit of liability is
increased under paragraph d. above as a result of a Coverage A loss.
2. If you comply with the provisions of paragraph 1. above and there is a loss to the dwelling insured under Coverage A, then paragraph
b. of Section I Condition 3. Loss Settlement is
deleted and replaced by the following:
b. Buildings under Coverage A or Coverage B
at replacement cost without deduction for
depreciation. Replacement cost will include
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any increased cost due to the enforcement
of any ordinance or law that regulates the
construction, repair or demolition of the
covered buildings. Loss settlements under
this paragraph are subject to the following:
(1) We will pay no more than the smallest
of the following amounts for equivalent
construction and use on the same premises:
(a) the replacement cost of the building or any parts of it;
(b) the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace the
building or any parts of it;
(c) the applicable limit of liability
whether increased or not, adjusted in accordance with paragraph l.d. or e. above.
(2) When the cost to repair or replace the
damaged building is more than $5,000,
we will pay no more than the replacement cost of the damage, less deduction
for depreciation, until actual repair or
replacement is completed.

COVERAGE M—PERSONAL PROPERTY AT
OTHER LOCATIONS
The limit of liability for Coverage C—Personal
Property usually located at an "insured's" residence, other than the "residence premises", is increased. The revised limit is shown for Coverage
M in the Declarations.
COVERAGE O—EARTHQUAKE
We insure for direct physical loss to property
covered under Coverage A—Dwelling and Coverage B—Other Structures, Section I, caused by
earthquake including land shock waves or tremors before, during or after a volcanic eruption.
1. One or more earthquake shocks that occur
within a seventy-two hour period constitute a
single earthquake.
2. The following is the only deductible that applies to Coverage A and Coverage B to each
loss caused by earthquake:
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We will pay only that part of the loss which
is more than a specified percentage of the
total amount of insurance that applies This
percentage is shown for Coverage 0 in the
Declarations. This deductible will apply separately to loss under Coverage A—Dwelling
and Coverage B—Other Structures. This deductible amount will not be less than $250
in any one loss.
All exclusions under Section I of this policy apply
to Coverage 0. However, the Section I—Earth
Movement exclusion does not apply to loss
caused by earthquake including land shock
waves or tremors before, during or after a volcanic eruption.
Special Exclusions
1. We do not cover loss resulting directly or indirectly from flood of any nature or tidal wave,
whether caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by earthquake.
2. We do not cover loss to exterior masonry veneer unless the words INCLUDING EXTERIOR
MASONRY VENEER are shown in the Declarations. If exterior masonry veneer is not covered, the value of the extenor masonry veneer
will be deducted before applying the deductible clause. For the purpose of this exclusion,
stucco is not considered masonry veneer
This coverage does not increase the limits of liability stated in this policy and does not include
the cost of filling land.
COVERAGE P—PERMITTED INCIDENTAL
OCCUPANCIES (Not applicable to Home Day
Care or similar operations.)
We cover the "business" conducted by an "insured" as described in Coverage P in the Declarations subject to the following. However, we do
not cover a "business" if it involves home day
care or similar operations.
Section I: Applies only when the described
"business" is conducted on the "residence premises".

2. Coverage C—Personal Property is extended to
include furnishings, supplies and equipment
used in connection with the described "business".
Item 8 under Special Limits of Liability does
not apply to the described "business".
Section II: Applies to the "residence premises"
or, if applicable, to an "insured location" when
shown in the Declarations as an ADDITIONAL
RESIDENCE.
Exclusions
All exclusions under Section II of this policy apply to Coverage P in addition to the following:
1 This insurance does not apply to "bodily injury" to:
a. any employee of an "insured" arising out
of the "business" use described in Coverage P in the Declarations other than to a
"residence employee" while engaged in the
employee's employment by an "insured";
or
b. any pupil arising out of corporal punishment administered by or at the direction of
the "insured".
2. Item (1) under exclusion Lb. of Coverage E—
Personal Liability and Coverage F—Medical
Payments to Others is deleted and the following substituted:
(1) activities which are usual to non-"business" pursuits or to the necessary or incidental use of the premises to conduct the
"business" pursuits as described in Coverage P in the Declarations; or

1. Coverage B—Other Structures is extended to
include structures used in connection with the
described "business".

COVERAGE Q—WATERCRAFT
Coverage E—Personal Liability and Coverage
F—Medical Payments to Others apply to "bodily
injury" or "property damage" arising out of:
1. the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or
unloading of the watercraft described for Coverage Q in the Declarations;
2. the entrustment by an "insured" of the watercraft described for Coverage Q in the Declarations to any person; or
3. statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor using a
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watercraft described for Coverage Q in the
Declarations.
All exclusions under Section II of this policy apply except to the watercraft described for Coverage Q in the Declarations.
This insurance does not apply with respect to
watercraft with inboard or inboard-outdrive motor power or sailing vessels:
1. to "bodily injury" to any employee of an "insured" arising out of and in the course of employment by the "insured" if the employee's
principal duties are in connection with the
maintenance or use of watercraft; or
2. while the watercraft is used to carry persons
for a charge or is rented to others.
COVERAGE R—BUSINESS PURSUITS
Coverage E—Personal Liability and Coverage
F—Medical Payments to Others apply to the
"business" pursuits of the "insured" as stated
for Coverage R in the Declarations.
All exclusions under Section II of this policy apply except to the "business" pursuits of the "insured" as stated for Coverage R in the Declarations. Additionally, this insurance does not apply:
1. to "bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the "business" pursuits of the "insured" in connection with a "business" owned
or financially controlled by the "insured" or
by a partnership of which the "insured" is a
partner or member;
2. to "bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the rendering of or failure to render
professional services of any nature other than
teaching, including but not limited to any:
a. architectural, engineering or industrial design services;
b. medical, surgical, dental or other services
or treatment conducive to the health of persons or animals; and
c. beauty or barber services or treatment;
3. to "bodily injury" to a fellow employee of the
"insured" injured in the course of employment; or
4. when the "insured" is a member of the faculty
or teaching staff of any school or college to
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"bodily injury" or "property damage" arising
out of the maintenance, use, loading, unloading or entrustment by the "insured" to any
person, of;
a. draft or saddle animals;
b. vehicles for use therewith;
c. aircraft;
d. motor vehicles or all other motorized land
conveyances; or
e. watercraft;
owned or operated, or hired by or for the "insured" or employer or used by the "insured"
for the purpose of instruction in the use
thereof.

OPTIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL
COVERAGES
This section of your policy contains supplemental coverage options which you may select. None
apply, however, unless specifically selected by
you. The supplemental coverages you select are
listed as endorsement numbers in the Declarations.

PERSONAL ARTICLES
SUPPLEMENT
(7710)
INSURING AGREEMENT
For an additional premium, we cover the classes
of property indicated on the Declarations page,
subject to the Definitions, Section I Conditions
and the Sections I and II Conditions of this policy
and all provisions of this supplement. The most
we will pay for loss to each class of property is
the amount of insurance less any deductible
shown for that class on the Declarations page.

CLASSES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
1. Jewelry, as scheduled.
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2. Jewelry, meaning articles of personal adornment owned by the "insured" composed at
least partially of precious metal, whether or
not set with gems or pearls, unscheduled.
3. Furs and garments trimmed with fur or consisting principally of fur, as scheduled.
4. Furs and garments trimmed with fur or consisting principally of fur, unscheduled.
5. Cameras, projection machines, films, home
video cameras and recorders, and related articles of equipment, as scheduled.
You agree not to use this equipment for pay
unless the words INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL USE are shown in the Declarations.
6. Musical Instruments and related articles of I
equipment, as scheduled.
You agree not to perform with these instruments for pay unless the words INCLUDING
PROFESSIONAL USE are shown in the Declarations.
7. Silverware, silver-plated ware, goldware,
gold-plated ware, and pewter-ware; but excluding pens, pencils, flasks, smoking implements, or jewelry.
8. Golfer's Equipment meaning golf clubs, golf
clothing, and golf equipment.
9. Fine Arts, as scheduled, at the location described in the Declarations page.
0. Postage Stamps owned by or in the custody
or control of the "insured", including the
following:
a. Due, envelope, official, revenue, match,
and medical stamps;
b. Covers, locals, reprints, essays, proofs,
and other philatelic property; or
c. Books, pages, and mountings of items in
a. and b.
1- Coin Collections owned by or in the custody
or control of the "insured" including the following:
a. Rare or current coins;
b. Medals, paper money, bank notes;
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c. Tokens of money and other numismatic
property; or
d. Coin albums, containers, frames, cards,
and display cabinets in use with the collection.
12. Personal Computers.
13. Sports Equipment, as scheduled.
14. Miscellaneous Property, not
otherwise
classed as described elsewhere in this supplement.

NEWLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY
We cover newly acquired items of a class of property already insured for their actual cash value.
However, for the class Fine Arts the most we will
pay is 25% of the amount of insurance. For all
other classes, the most we will pay is 25% of the
amount of insurance for that class of property, or
$25,000, whichever is less. For coverage to apply,
the "insured" must report these new items to us
within 30 days from the date acquired and pay
the additional premium from that date. This
paragraph does not apply to the class of property
Personal Effects.

PERILS INSURED AGAINST
We insure the described property against nsks of
direct physical loss subject to the General Exclusions and other provisions of this supplement.

LOSS DEDUCTIBLE
No deductible shall apply to any class of property unless specifically shown for that class in
the Declarations with an amount.
Each claim for loss shall be adjusted separately
in accordance with the Loss Settlement conditions of this supplement. If a deductible amount
is shown in the Declarations for a class of property, we will subtract that amount from each adjusted loss to that class.
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GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
Me do not cover:
1. Loss caused by wear and tear, gradual deterioration or inherent vice.
2. Loss caused by insects or vermin.
3. Loss caused by war, including the following
and any consequence of any of the following:
a. Undeclared war, civil war, insurrection,
rebellion, or revolution.
b. Warlike act by a military force or military
personnel.
c. Destruction, seizure, or use for a military
purpose.
Discharge of a nuclear weapon shall be
deemed a warlike act even if accidental.
4. Loss caused by nuclear hazard, to the extent
set forth in the Nuclear Hazard clause of
Section I — Conditions.
5. If Fine Arts are covered:
a. Loss caused by any repairing, restoration, or retouching process.
b. Loss to property on exhibition at fair
grounds or premises of national or international expositions, unless the premises
are covered by this policy.
6. If Musical Instruments are covered and organs not of a mobile nature are insured, we
do not cover loss or damage to such organs
caused by mechanical breakdown or failure,
repairing, adjusting, servicing or maintenance unless fire or explosion results; and
then only for the loss or damage by such resulting fire or explosion.
7. If Postage Stamps or Coin Collections are
covered:
a. Fading, creasing, denting, scratching,
tearing, or thinning.
b. Transfer of colors, inherent defect, dampness, extremes of temperature or depreciation.
c. Any damage from being handled or
worked on.
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d. Disappearance ot individual stamps*,
Coins, or other articles unless the item is:
(1) Described and scheduled with a specific amount of insurance; or
(2) Mounted in a volume and the page it
is attached to is also lost.
e. Loss to property in the custody of transportation companies.
f. Shipments by mail other than registered
mail.
g. Theft from any unattended automobile
unless the property is being shipped as
registered mail.
h. Loss to property not part of a Stamp or
Coin Collection.

TERRITORIAL LIMITS
We cover the property described worldwide.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS
1. If Fine Arts are covered under this supplement, you agree that such property will be
handled by competent packers.
2. Golfer's Equipment includes your clothing
while contained in a locker when you are
playing golf. We cover golf balls for loss only
by:
a. Fire; or
b. Burglary, provided there are visible
marks of forcible entry into the building,
room, or locker.

GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. LOSS CLAUSE
The amount of insurance under this supplement shall not be reduced except for a total
loss of a scheduled article. We will refund
the unearned premium applicable to such article after the loss.
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2, .OSS SETTLEMENT
Fine Arts — For a total loss to a scheduled item, we will pay the amount shown
in the schedule for that item. That
amount is agreed to be the value of the
article. Partial losses will be adjusted according to 2d. below.
D. Postage Stamps or Coin Collections —
The amount we will pay under these
classes of property will be determined as
follows:
(1) In case of loss to any scheduled item,
the amount to be paid will be determined in accordance with paragraph
2d. below.
(2) When Coins or Stamps are covered on
an unscheduled basis, we will pay the
cash market value at the time of loss, j
but not more than $1,000 on any un- I
scheduled Coin Collection, nor more
than $250 for any one stamp, coin, or
individual article or any one pair,
strip, block, series sheet, cover,
frame, or card.
We will not pay a greater proportion
of any loss on unscheduled property
than the amount insured on unscheduled property bears to the cash
market value of all such property at
the time of loss,
c. Jewelry — For a covered total loss to
scheduled jeweiry, if the words AGREED
VALUE JEWELRY COVERAGE APPLIES
are shown in the Declarations, we will
pay the amount shown in the schedule for
each article. That amount is agreed to be
the value of the article,
d. Other Property — Unless otherwise
stated in this supplement, the value of
the property insured is not agreed upon
but will be ascertained at the time of loss.
We will not pay more than the least of the
following amounts:
(1) The actual cash value of the property
at the time of loss.
I
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(2) The amount for which the property
could reasonably be expected to be
repaired to its condition just before
the loss.
(3) The amount for which the article
could reasonably be expected to be
replaced with one substantially identical.
(4) The applicable amount of insurance.
When furs or jewelry are covered on an
unscheduled basis, the amount to be paid
is also subject to the limit per article, as
shown in the Declarations page, for each
class.
e. Loss to a Pair, Set, or Parts
(1) Fine Arts — In case of loss to part of
a set, we agree to pay you the full
amount of the set as shown in the
schedule, if you agree to surrender
the remaining articles of the set to us.
If you do not agree we will settle according to 2e.(3)A. below.
(2) Jewelry — In case of loss to part of a
set, we agree to pay you the value of
the entire set in accordance with General Condition 2c, if you agree to surrender the remaining articles of the
set to us. If this Policy has been extended to provide agreed value jewelry coverage, then we will pay the
agreed value of the set.
If you do not agree to surrender the
remaining articles of the set to us, we
will settle according to 2e.(3)A. below.
(3) Other Property
A. Pair or Set
In case of a loss to a pair or set,
we may elect to:
(a) Repair or replace any part to
restore the pair or set to its
value before the loss; or
Kl

In this Policy " y o u " and "your" mean the
NAMED INSURED shown in the Declarations,
and the spouse if a resident of the same household. "We", "us" and "our" mean the member
company of The Travelers providing this insurance and shown as the INSURER in the Declarations. In addition, certain other words and
phrases, when printed in quotation marks, have
specific meanings when used in this policy. These
are defined as follows:
A. "Auto" means:
1. Any kind of private passenger motor vehicle including, but not limited to, an automobile, motorcycle, moped, pickup,
van, or self-propelled mobile home; or
2. While towed by a vehicle described in 1.
above, a trailer, farm tractor, farm
wagon or farm implements.
B. "Bodily injury" means bodily harm, sickness, or disease which occurs during the
term of this policy. It includes required
care, loss of services, death and mental
anguish that results.
C. "Business" includes any full or part-time
trade, profession, or occupation.
D. "Family member" means a resident of
your household who is:
I. Your relative, including your ward or
foster child; or

2. Under the age of 21 and in your care or
the care of any person named in 1.
above.
E. "Insured" means:
1. You; but, with respect to your use of an
"auto" you do not own which is furnished or available for your regular use,
only if you are insured for your use of
that "auto" under one or more "primary
insurance" policies for not less than the
auto liability deductible amount in Part
IV of this supplement;
2. Any "family member" if such "family
member"
a. Is legally responsible for an "occurrence" covered under this supplement; and
b. Is also insured for such "occurrence"
under one or more "primary insurance" policies for not less than the applicable deductible amount shown in
Part IV of this supplement.
3. Any other persons or organizations insured for the "occurrence" in your "primary insurance" policies, but only for
their liability for the acts or omissions of
an "insured" under Parts 1 or 2 of this
definition.
F. "Minimum retained limit" means the
greater of:
1. The total limits of any other insurance
that applies to the "occurrence", including insurance under other parts of this
policy, which:
a. Is available to an "insured"; or
b. Would have been available except for
the bankruptcy or insolvency of the
insurer providing "primary insurance"; or
2. The applicable deductible amount shown
in Part IV of this supplement.
G. "Occurrence" means an accident, including
exposure to conditions which results in
"bodily injury" or "property damage". All
injury* loss, or damage from continuous or
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(b) Pay the difference between actual cash value of the property before and after the loss.
B. Parts
In case of a loss to any part of covered property, consisting of several parts when complete, we will
pay for the value of the part lost
or damaged.

PERSONAL LIABILITY
UMBRELLA SUPPLEMENT
(3100)
PART I DEFINITIONS

repeated exposure to the same general conditions will be considered due to one "occurrence". It also means offenses which result in "personal injury".
For Loss Assessment coverage, "occurrence" also means:
1. Direct loss to property owned by all
members of the corporation or association collectively but only if the loss is
caused by a peril insured against under a
"primary insurance" policy and the loss
is covered by a property insurance policy issued to the corporation or association.
2. An act of a director, officer or trustee of a
corporation or association of property
owners, acting as a director, officer or
trustee, which results in "bodily injury",
"property damage" or "personal injury"
for which the corporation or association
becomes legally responsible, provided
the director, officer or trustee:
a. Is elected by the members of a corporation or association of property owners; and
b. Serves without deriving any income
from the exercise of duties which are
solely on behalf of a corporation or
association of property owners.
H. "Personal injury" means injury caused by
any of the following offenses committed
during the policy term:
1. False arrest;
2. False detention;
3. False imprisonment;
4. Malicious prosecution;
5. Libel;
6. Slander;
7. Defamation;
8. Violation of right of privacy;
9. Wrongful entry;
10. Wrongful eviction; or
11. Other invasion of right to private occupancy.
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I. "Primary i n s t a n c e " means any policy
providing the "insured" with initial or primary liability insurance covering one or
more of the types of liability listed in Part
IV of this supplement.
J. "Property damage" means physical injury
to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible
property which occurs during the policy
term.
K. "Recreational vehicle 1 ' means a land motor vehicle designed for recreational use off
public roads. It does not include "autos".
L. "Residence premises" means:
1. Any one to four-family dwelling that you
live in and its grounds. This includes
other structures on the grounds; or
2. The part of any other building where
you live. It does not include common
ground areas.

PART II INSURING AGREEMENT
In return for payment of premiums when due,
and subject to the Sections I and II Conditions of
this policy and the terms of this supplement, we
will pay damages for which the "insured" becomes legally responsible due to "bodily injury",
"property damage", or "personal injury" caused
by an "occurrence".
This coverage applies only to damages in excess
of the "minimum retained limit".

PART III DEFENSE AND
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES
A. Defense.
1. We will defend an "insured" if sued as a
result of an "occurrence" covered by this
supplement even if the suit is groundless,
false, or fraudulent.
2. We have the nght to jom in the defense of
any suit likely to involve us.
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3. We will not be obligated <to defend any
suit:
a. If the "occurrence" is covered by any
other insurance available to the "insured";
b. If there is no applicable "primary insurance" in effect at the time of the "occurrence" and the amount of damages
claimed or incurred is not more than
the applicable deductible amount
shown in Part IV of this supplement; or
c. After our limit of liability has been exhausted by the payment of judgments
or settlements.
4. We may investigate and settle any claim or
suit as we see fit.
B. Additional Coverages.
1. Defense costs
We will pay for the following in addition to
our limit of liability:
a. All costs and expenses we incur to defend a claim or lawsuit against an "insured".
b. Premiums on bonds required in a suit
we defend, but only for that portion of
the bond not exceeding our limit of liability. We are not obligated to apply for
or furnish these bonds.
c. Interest which accrues after judgment
in a lawsuit and before we pay, offer, or
deposit in court that part of the judgment which does not exceed our limit of
liability.
d. Reasonable expenses incurred by an
"insured" at our request. This includes
actual loss of wages up to $100 a day
due to attendance at hearings or trials
at our request.
e. In some countries, we may be prevented
from defending an "insured" because of
laws or other reasons. In that event we
will pay any expenses incurred with
our written consent for the "insured's"
defense.
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2. Loss Assessment
We will pay, in excess of the "minimum retained limit", your share of any loss assessment charged during the policy period
against you by a corporation or association of property owners. This only applies
when the assessment is made as a result of
an "occurrence" covered by this supplement.
This coverage applies only to loss assessment charged against you as owner or tenant of the "residence premises".
We do not cover loss assessments charged
against you or a corporation or association
of property owners by any government
body.
Payments made under this section are included in the applicable limit of liability.

PART IV DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNTS
Types of Liability

Deductible Amounts
$500,000 Per Occurrence
300,000 Per Occurrence

Auto
Personal . . .
Recreational
300,000 Per Occurrence
Vehicle . .
300,000 Per Occurrence
Watercraft
. .
Business
300,000 Per Occurrence
Pursuits . .
Business
300,000 Per Occurrence
Property . .
Employers
300,000 Per Occurrence
Liability . .
50,000 Per Occurrence
Loss Assessment
If the "insured" maintains "primary insurance"
with "auto" liability limits of $500,000/$500,000
"bodily injury" and $100,000 "property damage", then the deductible amount applicable to
"auto" liability shall be such limits.
A deductible of $1,000 will apply to each "occurrence" which:
1. is covered by this supplement; and
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2. arises out of a vehicle, property, or other exposure insured by "primary insurance"
with limits at least equal to the applicable
deductible amount shown above; and
3. is not covered under the provisions of the
policies referred to in No. 2 above.
This provision does not apply to Loss Assessment.

PART V EXCLUSIONS
This insurance does not apply:
1. To damages the "insured" or any company
providing "primary insurance" may have
to pay under any of the following laws:
a. Worker's Compensation;
b. Unemployment Compensation;
c. Disability benefits; or
d. Any other similar law.
2. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or
"personal injury" arising out of:
a. The ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of an aircraft;
b. The entrustment by an "insured" of an
aircraft to any person; or
c. Statutorily imposed vicarious parental
liability for the actions of a child or minor using an aircraft.
Aircraft means any contrivance used or
designed for flight except model or
hobby aircraft not used or designed to
carry people or cargo.
3. To "property damage" to:
a. Property owned by an "insured".
b. Watercraft under the care, custody, or
control of an "insured".
c. Property rented to, occupied or used by,
or in the care of an "insured" to the extent the "insured" is under contract to
provide insurance for such damage.
However, this exclusion does not apply
to liability imposed on the "insured" by
common law or statute.
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4. To "bodily injury" or "property damage"
expected or intended by an "insured".
However, this exclusion does not apply to
"bodily injury" or "property damage" resulting from an "insured's" use of reasonable force to protect persons or property.
5. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or
"personal injury" arising out of "business"
property or "business" pursuits of an "insured". However, this exclusion does not
apply to:
a. Any part of a one to four-family residential dwelling you rent or hold for
rent other than the "residence premises";
b. Condominium units you rent or hold for
rent, other than a "residence premises".
c. Any "residence premises" or other one
to four-family residence occupied in
part as an office, school or studio.
d. Any "residence premises":
(1) Rented or held for rent in part, unless intended for use as a residence
by more than two roomers or boarders per family;
(2) Occasionally rented or held for rent
for short periods of time for dwelling purposes;
(3) Rented or held for rental as a private garage.
e. Occasional or part-time jobs of "insureds" who are students under 21
years of age.
f. Civic activities performed by an "insured" without pay.
g. Activities connected with the "insured's" occupation if a Collector, Messenger, Salesman or Teacher except:
(1) We will not pay for "bodily injury"
or "property damage" arising out of
a business or school the "insured":
(a) Financially controls;
(b) Is a joint venture member of; or
(c) Is a partner in.
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(2) We will not pay for claims or damages arising out of the maintenance,
use, loading or unloading, or entrustment by the "insured" to any
person of:
(a) Draft or saddle animals;
(b) Vehicles for use therewith;
(c) Aircraft;
(d) Motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances; or
(e) Watercraft;
owned or operated, or hired by or
for the "insured" or employee or
used by the "insured" for the purpose of instruction in the use
thereof.
h. The providing of home day care service,
but only when,
(1) an "insured" provides such service
for a relative of an "insured"; or
(2) a mutual exchange of services arrangement exists involving no monetary compensation.
i. The incidental use of your private passenger "autos" by an "insured" or any
partner, agent or employee of an "insured" in the "business" of:
(1) selling;
(4) storing; or
(2) repairing;
(5) parking;
(3) servicing;
vehicles designed for use mainly on public highways.
However, we do not cover vehicles
owned by an "insured" primarily for
use in such "business".
j . The use of private passenger "autos" by
an "insured" for "business" purposes
not described in 5.i. above. However, we
do not cover the carrying of persons for
a fee, other than in a car pool arrangement.
k. Incidental farming by any "insured" on
the "residence premises".
6. To the rendering of or failure to render any
professional service.
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7. To "bodily injury", "property damage"
and "personal injury" due to an 4t insured's" act or omission as a member of
the board of directors of any corporation,
except non-profit corporations or organizations.
8. To the extent that any other insurance is
available to the "insured".
9. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or
"personal injury" for which the "insured"
is also covered under a nuclear energy liability policy, even if the limits of liability
for that policy have been exhausted
10. To "personal injury" due to:
a. Violation of a penal statute or ordinance
by or with the knowledge of the "insured";
b. Advertising, broadcasting, or telecasting activities by the "insured", or
c. Libel, slander, defamation, or violation
of privacy:
(1) If the same first injurious publication or utterance occurs prior to the
effective date of this issuance; or
(2) If the offense committed is about
any organization or business, its
products, or services, made with the
knowledge of the falsity and by or
at the direction of the "insured".
11. To "bodily injury" or "property damage"
due to the release or escape of:
a. Waste materials;
b. Irritants;
c. Contaminants; or
d. Pollutants.
However, this exclusion does not apply if
the release or escape is sudden and accidental.
12. To "bodily injury" or "property damage"
caused directly or indirectly by war, including undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a
military force or military personnel, destruction or seizure or use for a military
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13.
14.

15.

16.

purpose, and including any consequence of
any of these. Discharge of a nuclear
weapon shall be deemed a warlike act even
if accidental.
To "bodily injury" and "personal injury"
to any "insured".
To "bodily injury" or "property damage"
arising out of the use of any "auto", "recreational vehicle", or watercraft in racing
events, including practicing for a race.
This exclusion does not apply to sailboats.
To "bodily injury" or "personal injury"
arising out of the transmission of a communicable disease by an "insured".
To amounts assessed against you by a corporation or association of property owners
except as provided under Additional Coverages—Loss Assessment.

PART VI CONDITIONS
The following conditions apply in addition to the
Sections I and II Conditions of this policy;
A. "INSURED'S" DUTIES AFTER AN
OCCURRENCE
In the event of an "occurrence" which may
involve this supplement, the "insured" must
do the following:
1. Give us a prompt, written notice. Include
the names and addresses of all witnesses
and injured persons.
2. Promptly send us copies of all notices or
legal papers related to the "occurrence".
3. Cooperate with us in the investigation settlement, or defense of any claim or suit.
B. SUIT AGAINST US
No legal action shall be brought against us:
1. Unless the "insured" has fully complied
with all the terms of this policy; and
2. Until the amount of damages in excess of
the "minimum retained limit" has been
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settled/This Amount may be determined
either by judgment against the "insured"
or by written agreement signed by the "insured", the claimant, and us.
No one has the right to involve us as a party
to any legal action to determine the liability
of an "insured".
C. LIMIT OF LIABILITY
The most we will pay for all damages for any
one "occurrence" is the limit shown on the
Declarations page, regardless of the number
of "insureds", claimants, or claims made.
D. SEVERABILITY OF INSURANCE
This coverage applies separately to each "insured". This condition will not increase our
limit of liability for any one "occurrence".
E. SUBROGATION
All of the "insured's" rights of recovery will
become our rights to the extent of any payment we make under this supplement. The
"insured" will do everything necessary to secure such rights, and do nothing after loss to
prejudice such rights.
If we pay under this supplement and another
person may be liable, we can exercise the
rights of an "insured" against the person liable for the loss. Any recovery will be distributed in the following order:
1. First, to any person who may have paid
the liability exceeding the limit of our liability.
2. Second, to us for the amount we have
paid.
3. Then, to any other party.
The above amounts will be repaid less our
proportionate share of the costs of recovery.
This includes reasonable attorneys1 fees.
F. APPEALS
If the "insured" or any other insurer elects
not to appeal a judgment which exceeds the
"minimum retained limits" we may do so. We
will pay the cost and interest incidental to appeal.
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G. BANKRUPTCY OF AN INSURED
Bankruptcy or insolvency of an "insured"
will neither:
1 Relieve us of our obligations under this
supplement, nor
2 Operate to cause this supplement to become primary in the event the "insured" is
unable to satisfy the applicable deductible
amount shown in Part IV of this supplement either because of insufficient "primary insurance" or personal assets
This policy is signed for the member company of
The Travelers Insurance Companies which is the
insurer under this policy
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President
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